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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code
Ann.,

§

78-2a-3(2) (h), and by Rules 3 and 4, of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Petitioner and Appellant, JENNIFER MELISSA THURSTON,
request this Honorable Court consider upon this appeal the issues
which follow:
a.

Whether the Sixth Judicial District Court denied the

due process rights of the Petitioner when it summarily deprived her
of the right to a hearing and to present evidence? Preserved at R.
86; Tr. pp. 5-6, 9-10.
b.

Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to

present evidence upon the issues set forth in the UCCJA, at Section
78-45c-3, in order to determine whether the basis' of jurisdiction
in this state exist? Preserved at R. 86-88; Tr. pp. 5-10.
c.

Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to

present testimony and documentary evidence as to the home state of

1

the children, the best interest of the children, the significant
connections the children and parents have with the State of Utah,
and the lack of significant connections with the State of Oregon?
Preserved at R. 86-88; Tr. pp. 5-10.
d.

Whether

the

Petitioner

is

entitled

to

present

evidence, testimonial and documentary, upon emergencies, abuse and
maltreatment of the children and the Petitioner by the Respondent?
Preserved at R. 86-88; Tr. pp. 8-9.
e.

Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to

present evidence as to the children's present and future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships? Preserved at R.
86-88. Tr. pp. 5-10.
f.

Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to

present evidence that the State of Oregon was without jurisdiction
over the children and the Petitioner? Preserved at R. 86-88; Tr.
pp. 5-10.
g.

Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to

present evidence that she had not been served with Oregon documents
giving the State of Oregon jurisdiction, and that no Oregon divorce
case had ever been filed? Preserved at R. 44, 86-88; Tr. pp. 5-10.
h.

Whether a conversation by the trial court with a

judicial officer of the State of Oregon should have been made upon
the record or a contemporaneous record of the conversation with the
trial court made? Preserved at R. 86-88; Tr. p. 7.
2

i.

Should the trial court have made findings of fact and

conclusions of law upon the issues set forth in the UCCJA, Utah
Code Annotated, Sections 78-45c-3,4,5,6, and 7. Preserved at R. 8688; Tr. p. 8.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review governing the determination of
each

of

the

issues

presented

upon

this

appeal,

because

no

particular deference is given to the trial court's rulings on
questions of law, is the correction of error standard. Liska y.
Liska, 902 P.2d 644 (UT App. 1995); Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157
(UT App. 19 92 ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 8, 1999, Jennifer Thurston and her children
returned to Sterling, Utah from the State of Oregon. R. 44.
On March 24,

1999, the Sixth Judicial District Court

issued an Ex Parte Protective Order granting custody of the parties
children, Tricia and Christopher, to Jennifer Thurston, restraining
Ronald Thurston from removing the children from the State of Utah
and restraining him from inflicting domestic violence and abuse
upon Jennifer Thurston and her minor children, and ordering him to
stay away from the children's schools and church in Sterling, Utah.
R.54-57.
On April 5, 1999, Ronald Thurston filed a Petition for
Restraining Order to Prevent Abuse under the Oregon Family Abuse
3

Prevention Act, case number 99-1558, before the Circuit Court of
Lincoln County, Oregon.

This Petition has never been served upon

Jennifer Thurston. R. 83-84; Tr. pp. 6, 7.
On April 7,

1999,

a hearing was held upon Jennifer

Thurston's Verified Petition for Protective Order in the Sixth
Judicial District Court for Sanpete County before the Honorable
David L. Mower.

The morning of the hearing Mr. Thurston filed a

response to Jennifer's Petition for a Protective Order. R. 58-66.
On April 7,

1999,

the Utah District Court entered a

Protective Order awarding custody of the children to Jennifer
Thurston,

restraining Ronald Thurston from committing abuse or

domestic violence against Jennifer Thurston and ordering him to
stay away from the children's schools and church. R. 67-72.
On May 18, 1999, Mr. Thurston filed a Motion to Vacate
Protective Order requesting custody of the children. R.73-74.
On May 28, 1999, a hearing was held before the trial
court in the protective order proceeding upon Mr. Thurston's Motion
to Vacate Protective Order. R.75-78.

Jennifer Thurston and her

counsel, and Ronald Thurston appeared at the hearing, and presented
argument.

R.

78.

Also,

on May 28,

1999, Mr. Thurston had a

document notorized in Ephraim, Utah, wherein he stated that he
gives sole custody of the children to Jennifer Thurston. R. 77.
On June 11, 1999, in the Utah Protective Order proceeding
the trial court entered an Order Upon Motion to Vacate Protective
4

Order. R.78-80.
Order

stating

residents

of

The order denied the motion to vacate Protective
that

Jennifer

Sanpete

Thurston

County,

the

and

court

the
had

children

were

exercised

it's

jurisdiciton to protect Jennifer and the children, and that Mr.
Thurston did not present any evidence to justify the court denying
Utah's

jurisdiction

or

vacating

the

protective

order,

and

reaffirmed the Protective Order entered April 7, 1999. R. 78-80.
On June 7, 1999, Ronald Thurston filed a Motion to Modify
the Restraining Order in the Oregon Court, case number 99-1558, the
case which had never been served upon Jennifer Thurston. R. 121.
Although Ronald Thurston's original Petition and the
motion to modify had not been served upon Jennifer Thurston, on
June 24, 1999, Jennifer Thurston made a special appearance in the
spouse abuse proceeding in the Oregon Court and challenged the
jurisdiction of the Oregon Court because she had not been served
with the Respondent's Petition for Restraining Order to Prevent
Abuse under the Oregon Family Abuse Prevention Act, ORS 107.701, et
seq.,

and as required by ORS 109.724,

and 109.754.

She also

challenged the Oregon court's jurisdiction based upon the two prior
custody orders entered in Utah. R. 121.

The children were not

present in Oregon at the time but had been living in Utah since
January 8, 1999. R. 44.
On June 24, 1999, the Oregon judge pro tern, Frederick
Bennett, modified the unserved restraining order entered in that
5

court on April 5, 1999, to change custody of the children from
Jennifer Thurston to Ronald Thurstion in violation of ORS 109.727.
The Oregon Court did not contact the Utah Court.

The Oregon court

ignored the fact that Jennifer Thurston had not been served Ronald
Thurston's original petition nor the motion to modify his original
petition. The Oregon court did not take evidence upon the issues of
the appropriate jurisdiction nor did it enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law upon the question under the UCCJA. Tr. pp. 5-10.
On July 12, 1999, Jennifer Thurston filed a Verified
Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court for
Sanpete County within the State of Utah. R.1-7.
Jennifer Thurston

filed her Motion

for

On July 14, 1999,

Order to Show Cause,

Affidavit of Petitioner and thereupon the trial Court issued it's
Order to Show Cause, requesting, inter alia, custody of the part.ies
minor children. R.S-21.
On August 5, 1999, an Acceptance of Service of Process
executed by Ronald Thurston was filed with the trial court. R.22.
On August 6, 1999, Ronald Thurston filed a pro se Answer
to Verified Petition for Divorce. R.27-28.

On August 6,

1999,

Ronald Thurston filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause. R.2425.

Attached

to

the

Response

was

an

unauthenticated

and

uncertified copy of a Modification of Family Abuse Restraining
Order of the Oregon court dated June 25, 1999. R.26.

This order

was never and has never been served upon Jennifer Tr. pp. 5-10.
6

On August 13, 1999, a hearing was held upon Jennifer
Thurston's Motion for Order to Show Cause.

Jennifer Thurston,

Ronald Thurston and Kimberly Dunham testified at the hearing.
Thurston

during

the

presentation

of

witnesses

requested

Mr.
a

continuance because he was having chest pains. R.29-31.
On August 16, 1999, the trial court sent a Notice of
Scheduling

Conference

to

the

parties

setting

the

scheduling

conference for September 3, 1999. R.32-33.
On September 3, 1999, a scheduling conference was held by
the trial court which set the case for trial on November 4, 1999.
R.34.

Ronald Thurston appeared by telephone.

A Notice of Domestic

Trial was sent to Petitioner's counsel and Ronald Thurston, on
September 3, 1999. R.35-36.
On

October

7,

1999,

the

Ronald Thurston

filed

his

Respondent's Petition to Enforce Visitation. R.37-38.
Sometime during late October or early November of 1999,
the Oregon court in the Oregon abuse restraining order proceeding
contacted the Utah Court.

The Utah trial court unilaterally

cancelled the trial date without explanation to Jennifer Thurston.
There

is

nothing

in the

record indicating that

this

exparte

conversation occurred, or when it occurred, or what was considered
other than the trial court's declaration on December 10, 1999, that
there had been such a conversation. R. 1-136, Tr. pp. 5-10.
On November 30, 1999, Jennifer Thurston filed her Motion
7

for Declaration of Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act. R.39-40.

The motion was supported by the

Affidavit of Jennifer Thurston, which was accompanied by several
attachments. R. 41-80.

A Notice of Hearing Upon Jurisdiction was

filed on November 30, 1999, scheduling a hearing in the trial court
on the motion for December 10, 1999. R. 81-82.
On

December

2,

1999,

an

unsigned,

uncertified

and

unauthenticated copy of an Order of Consolidation from an Oregon
Court with the purported date of November 12, 1999, was filed in
the trial court. The order did not bear any Oregon court filing
stamp, certification nor authentication. R.83-84, 136.
On December 10, 1999, a hearing was held before the trial
court

upon

Jennifer

Thurston's

Motion

for

Declaration

of

Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act. R. 85; R.137; Tr. 1-12.
On February 4, 2000, Ronald Thurston's counsel mailed a
proposed Order to counsel for Jennifer Thurston. R. 89-91.

On

February 11, 2000, Jennifer Thurston mailed Objections to Proposed
Order. R. 86-88.
The Utah trial court entered it's Order declaring that
the state of Oregon has jurisdiction over the matter and issues and
dismissed Jennifer Thurston's Verified Petition for Divorce on
February 22, 2000, in spite of and over the objections of Jennifer
Thurston. R. 89-91.
8

---

......

,

ll(.)l.

conclusions of law supporting the Order. R. 89-94.
On March 14, 2000, Jennifer Thurston timely filed her
Notice of Appeal. P. 94-97.

Dissolution of Marriage in the Lincoln County Circuit Court for the
State of Oregon which has not been served upon Jennifer Thurston.
D

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
:enn_;_l.e~

and Rona.1.-.... Ld..;rs:...on were marr.Le .... on

~~•Jrston

the 28th day of January, 1983, in the County of Sanpete within the
State of Utah. R. 2, 42.

cr;_;_,Jren as

js::;ue o:

:_t;e~::::

mbrrlage

a:

Lee, born the 6th day of August, 1983, Trischa Leighanne, born the
16th day of July, 1985, and Christopher Lyndon, a born the 5th day

for their entire lives in Sanpete

Co~Lty

within

~ne

State of Utah.

Ronald Thurston has resided in Sanpete County within the State of
Utah for most of his entire life. R. 42.
"' .
Thurston, intending to

retur~

·

'~.

d .f

.o permanent ·i reside ·,
J._

Sanpete County, Utah, moved to Oregon because the Respondent was
9

offered temporary employment.

Prior to moving to Oregon the family

lived at 251 South Main Street in Sterling, Utah.

When the family

moved to Oregon for the temporary work they did not move their
furniture, nor most of their clothing and personal effects.
5.

R. 42.

The children spent several months, during their stay

in Oregon, at their home in Sterling, Utah. R. 42.
6.

In October, 1997, Jennifer Thurston and her children

began packing their few things to return to Sterling, Utah.

As

they were leaving Ronald Thurston attacked Jennifer physically and
injured her.
body.

He struck her with his fists in the and about her

He kicked her several times.

and onto the floor.

He threw her against the walls

He took her car keys from her and cut the

brake lines on her car.

Jennifer Thurston was physically forced by

the Ronald Thurston to stay in Oregon against her will. R. 42.
7.

Ron Thurston physically abused Jennifer on several

occasions after this in order to compel her to submit to him.

He

would not allow the Petitioner and her children to return home to
Sterling, Utah, where they maintained their home, furniture and
personal effects.

He made her submit to him by inflicting regular

physical abuse upon her.
each week.

He struck and kicked her several times

He often beat her daily. R. 43.
8.

Beginning in October, 1997, Ronald Thurston began

druging Jennifer to keep her in Oregon with him.
allow her to leave the rented house without him.
10

He refused to
He threatened to

He pointed a loaded hand aun at her,

Utah.

s0veral occasions durina

rr

that

.Ll

her

sne tried to return home to

and put it in her

~007

,::,L.erJ...Lily,

uLctrr,

11e wuuJ..u

)',.j_j_j_

The Respondent choked Jennifer several times until she 1ost

consciousness.
arque with his new wife, Kimberly Dunham.
children with

(2',

plurality.
fists

KlTI~er2

Inurston hit t.he Petl tioneL . LI1 the iace Wl U1 i1lS

i·lL.

several

times and blackened

Kimber1 y Dun han '

~lckPrl

leaving bru1ses all over her.
9.

Mr. Thurston has had two

On

,:ran11arv

r.

h()th

()f

Jennifer . n
K.
~

hPr

P\JPC1..

r bodv sE::Vel :::.

lfnes

43-44.

ggg,

Ronald Thurston

struck the

tried to ston him from hittinq and injuring Trischa and he beqan
c:

,_ t .

father, Gerald Gibb, ana ner sister, Megan, who tooK Jennifer and
~h~1rl~~~
_l :

'

10.

~~

~h-~~

TH-

h-~

On Marc.t1

l..:;,

J..::.J'::J'::',

~h

the Ronalo

D

II II

lllu..Lstull

threatened to

kill the Jennifer on several occasions in Sterling,
threatened

~c

l...v

vvuc.Lc

v.Lc'-Jva,

Utah,

and

take the childH''n from their home i::-1 3tcr1i;-,::;, "+-3t,
;:ce

~as

living with Kimbe.r·ly Dunham and their two

children. R. 44.
March 24, 1999,

LIH::;

Jerunfer appl...Led tc

:.~1e

Sixth

Judicial District Court of Sanpete County for a Protective Order.
The Court made findings that the Court had jurisdiction over the
Jennifer and the children and that they had been physically abused,
that

domestic

violence

had

occurred

and

thereupon

issued

a

Protective Order protecting the Petitioner and her children from
the violence and abuse the Respondent was inflicting upon them.
copy

of

the

Ex

Parte

Protective

Order was

attached

to

A
the

Petitioner's Affidavit in support of the motion for declaration of
jurisdiction as Exhibit A. R. 44-45, 54-57.
12.
Jennifer's

On April 7,

Petition

for

Judicial District Court.

1999,

a

a hearing was held upon the

Protective

Order

before

the

Sixth

At the hearing on April 7, 1999, the Mr.

Thurston appeared and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
district

court

by filing

a written response

Petition for Protective Order.

R.

58-67.

to the Verified

In his response he

consented to follow the orders of the Court and made affirmative
requests for relief. R. 58-66. At this hearing the Court found that
it had jurisdiction over Jennifer, Ronald and their children, that
the Jennifer and the children had been physically abused by the Mr.
Thurston, and awarded Jennifer custody of the parties' children. R.
67-72. The Court also restrained Ronald Thurston from inflicting
further

abuse

children. R.

and

67-72.

violence

upon

Jennifer

Thurston

and

the

A copy of the answer of Mr. Thurston was

attached to the Petitioner's Affidavit in support of the motion for
12

declaration of jurisdiction as Exhibit B (R. 58-66), and a copy of
the Court's Protective Order was attached as Exhibit C. R. 67-72.
13.

On May 18, 1999, Mr. Thurston filed a Motion to

Vacate Protective Order in the Sixth Judicial District Court and
his motion was heard on the 28th day of May, 1999. R. 45, 73-76.
Ronald Thurston personally appeared in court on that day asking for
affirmative relief.
parties children.

He asked the Court to award him custody of the
The Court found that Jennifer Thurston and the

children had been physically abused by Ron Thurston and that the
Court had exercised it's jurisdiction to protect Jennifer and the
children from him.

The Court found that Ronald Thurston had not

presented any evidence whatsoever to justify denying jurisdiction
or otherwise vacate the Protective Order previously entered and
denied his requests to vacate the order and award him custody of
the children.

A copy of the Order Upon Motion to Vacate Protective

Order was attached to the Jennifer Thurston's affidavit in support
of the motion as Exhibit D. R. 46.
14.

On July 12, 1999, Jennifer Thurston filed a Verified

Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court.
divorce proceeding was

a

divorce

proceeding ever been filed in Oregon. R. 46, Addendum D.

On the

13th day

of August,

pending

1999,

a

in Oregon,

hearing was

Thurston's Motion for Order to Show Cause.

nor

held

has

No

upon

Jennifer

Mr. Thurston appeared

personally at the hearing and made requests for affirmative relief,
13

including n request for custody of the parties' children. R. 46. He
presented evidence and examined witnesses at this evidentiary
hearing.

The Utah Court ordered that Jennifer continue to have

custody of the minor children. R. 29-31, 46.
15.

Jennifer Thurston's children presently resided with

her in their home at 251 South Main Street in Sterling, Utah, had
have since January 8, 1999, and had for at least the eleven (11),
months preceeding the hearing upon the Motion for Declaration of
Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act.

She and the

children live with the

grandparents, Gerald Gibb and Nell Gibb.

children's maternal
The children's aunts,

Megan Gibb and Eileen Christiansen, and the children's cousins, who
lived with the children during this period and are witnesses in
this proceeding. R. 47.
16.

The children, Christopher and Trischa, are presently

and have been enrolled in the Manti Elementary School and Manti
High School.

The children's teachers all reside and work in

Sanpete County, Utah.

Christopher's teachers are Dave Stevens,

Barbara Eliason, Dale Rice and Cindy Henningsen are teachers at
Manti Elementary in Sanpete County, Utah.

Brennan Jackson, Connie

Good, and James Peterson are teachers and the Vice Principal and
Principal at the Manti High School, in Manti, Utah.

Christopher's

scout leader is Arla Otten, who lives and works in Sanpete County,
Utah.

These teachers are witnesses in this proceeding. R. 47.
14

17.

Dr.

The children's doctor is Von Pratt.

1

'

r' 1 ,....
.)...- ........ ..L

treated them continuously during their lives.

18.

The children's

R_

r\o---r'... ~
~:.~
1

-.

The children had not

received a.ny medical treatment whatsoever lil Oregou.
are witnesses in this proceeding.

Pratt

Ihese doctors

47-4R.

dE::~ntists

Ernie Larsen,

c·n·r-;

Gunnison, Utah, and Dr . .Keeu UILlSt.en.seu,

u.L

.K__LCllL.Le__Lu,

uLai1.

u.L.

Larsen lives and practices dentistry ir1 Sanpete County,
Christensen lives and practices dentistry in Sevier County, Utah.
These

dentis~s
p::o·\/.lCiL:G

are

wi~nesses

ael~L-.:3

i~

proceeding.

~his

Dr. Lee Thurst0n,

__ . . ...I...-_:_'---

..... -.J

- ----I

for their entire lives prior to treatment by Dr. Larsen and Dr.
Chr.Lstensen.
J9.

Utah.

.Lne cnl.Laren nave no aenLl5L5 lD uregon . .K. qo.

'T'rischa, was and is curne>ntJv

in

therapy with

Dr. Edgington is a witness in this proceeding.
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The cn.L__Lurert

:3.
20.

Uldt

Dianna Robbins and David Lindbloom, of the Division

Jennifer Thurston

had

abused

her.

children.

They c::oncl_,-Jed

tnat tne Mr. Tnurston's claims were contrived and unsubstantiated.
These w.Ltnesses work ana reside in
21.

Mant~,

The children are Latter Day Saints and their church
15

leaders and counselors reside in Sterling, Utah.

The children's

Bishop is Tim Denton, who lives and works in Sterling, Utah.

The

children's religious leaders have been their clergy for their
entire lives. R. 48-49.
22.

Jerry Jensen and Jessica Jensen are witnesses in

this proceeding of the primary care of the children. R. 49.
23.

Sheriff Claude Pickett, Lt. Rick Howe, Deputy Andy

Lyons, and Deputy John Cox, all of the Sanpete County Sheriff's
Office are witnesses in this proceeding and all live and work in
Sanpete County, Utah. R. 49.
24.

Megan Larsen, Zaccary Cox, Devan and Dusty McNiel

are the children's best friends.

These witnesses live and attend

school in Sanpete County, Utah. R. 49.
25.
the

Jennifer is and has been the primary caretaker of

children during the marriage.

cleaning of the children's home.
for the children.

She performed all of the

She performed all of the cooking

She has been the person responsible for the

feeding, clothing, bathing, education of the children.

She has

provided all of the medical and dental treatment for the children
when they were in need of treatment.
church regularly each Sunday.

She has taken the children to

The witnesses of these facts are

those individuals named above. R. 49.
26.

Jennifer's grandparents, Helen Gibb and Nell Miller,

also live in Utah, and they witnesses in this proceeding.
16

Her aunt

1r:•n's dunL and uncle,

Querido are witnesses
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1

r1

Christina and i'\lfr.:-<ic

this action and resioe

.:>p.r 111y v .L.L.Le,

l_ll

Ronald Thurston's parent and the rhi1rlrpnfq
Helen

'.

.,..,
--C.""I

res2.a.es

witness in this proceedina.

n~tPrn~l

R. 50.

ave any relat_ves

from his family who reside in the State ot Oregon.

His relatives

reside in Utat, ard Cc1ifornia.
who have relevant ana rnater:la.L Know.Leuge o1. wtl.LCil u1ey mdy

Le~Lj_ly

in this proceeding. n
1 G G'l

extramarital sexual affair
Kim Dunham have

h~d

~wn

Wltl:t L.i.3

girlfrienG.,

.t~ .... m

Dunham.

he

and

rhilrlrPn

I?\_

Jer,nifer be
wife, Kimberlv Dunham. R. 51.
30~

Rona :La

hurston

Kimberly Dunham engage

have exposea tne cn11aren to lnJurlous nenavlours.
31.

~-

\-llt::;

entered a P rotectl ve Orde.r p.turalJ..L L.1.119 abuse against

of

;-; ::,nd

~1.

Mr. Thurston and Kimberly Dunham have physically and
Cll1U

~nrl

~

tr.1.a.1.
UH:.;

v0Urt

ver,n_;_.r..er

thP rhilrlrPn hv Mr_ Thurston and awarded her thP sole rustody
~_rtE!

nurr~er

children,

lrl::<<.

:cJ

and ':hristopher on Apr""

994600040. R. 51-52, 67-74.
1 '7

~"l

case

32.

The Office of Recovery Services for the State of

Utah has assessed and is trying to collect child support for the
children.

Jennifer provides a safe, noncombative, nonabusive, drug

and alcohol free environment for the children who are in need of
the stability and guidance which she can provide to them.
children desire

to

live with

their mother

at

their home

The
in

Sterling, Utah. R. 52.
33.

Mr. Thurston lied in his Petition for Restraining

Order to Prevent Abuse in Oregon, case number 991558, at question
8B, when he asserted that there was not another restraining order
pending between Jennifer and him,

nor another case concerning

custody pending in any other state.

At the time he had been served

with an order of custody, the Exparte Protective Order, from the
Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpete County, Utah, and he was
aware of the case in Utah.

He lied in his Oregon Petition when he

stated the children were living with him in Oregon, when in fact
the children were physically living with Jennifer in Sterling,
Utah.

Jennifer Thurston was not served with Mr. Thurston's Oregon

Petition for Protective Order.
34.

R. 52-53.

On July 12, 1999, Jennifer Thurston filed a Verified

Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court for
Sanpete County,

Utah,

and Mr.

requesting affirmative relief.

Thurston answered the petition
No petition for divorce had been

filed in the State of Oregon at the time. R. 1-7.
18

er;rLi fer.

1J1UI.::; Lur1

f

lled

!IE:::! I.

Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. R. 39-40, 41-82.
36.

Jennifer appeared at the hearing on the motion on

December 10, 1999, with her witnesses prepared to present evidence
of the question of jurisdiction and the best
children.

Mr.

interest of the

Thurston did not appear at the hearing but was

represented by his counsel, Lawrence Hunt.

No witnesses appeared

at the hearing on behalf of Mr. Thurston.

No divorce proceeding

had been filed, nor has been filed, in the State of Oregon. R. 85,
86-88, Tr. pp. 5-10.

~ou~t

declared tha:

,j

~3 c

ken

a r.

·,v :i t ~

f f

ice r c :: the em r ~

-,

evidence, declared Oregon the 4arisdictior

3r .

nrucJ r

sut>wltted. e:

tria~

summarily

co;_rt

disrrcis:=E~d

:'

r .LJ1Ul1H:J.

Law were not submitted with the proposed Order. R. 89-91.
39.

On February 11, 2000, Jennifer filed her Objections

to Proposed Order.

The objections stated that the trial Court, in

order to determine whether the bases of jurisdiction in this state
19

exist must receive evidence upon the issues which are set forth ih
the UCCJA,

at

section 78-45c-3.

The objections

stated that

Jennifer appeared on December 10, 1999, intending to call several
witnesses

to

offer testimony upon

the

basis

of

jurisdiction

including the home state of the children at the time of the
commencement of the proceeding, the best interests of the children,
and the significant connections the children and parents have with
the State of Utah, and the lack of significant connections the
children and the parties have with the State of Oregon.

She

objected that she had present in court several witnesses who would
have testified as to the children's present and future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships.

Jennifer would

have proved that the State of Oregon was without jurisdiction
pursuant to the UCCJA, and other facts showing that she had not
been served Oregon documents giving Oregon jurisdiction, and that
no Oregon divorce case had ever been filed. R. 86-88. Addendum D.
Jennifer Thurston objected that any conversation with a
purported judicial officer of the State of Oregon should have been
made

upon

the

record

and

a

contemporaneous

record

of

the

conversation with the trial court made. R. 86-88.
Jennifer Thurston objected that she should have been
given the opportunity to be heard and present witnesses and other
evidence pursuant to UCCJA,

sections 78-45c-3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, and

findings of fact should have been made.
20

She objected that findings

of fact should have been made on the factors in determining the
most convenient forum, the best interests of the children, the home
state, Mr. Thurston's misconduct, costs and other material factors
in determining which state has jurisdiction. R. 86-88.
40.

The trial Court entered the Respondent's proposed

Order on February 22,

2000,

despite Jennifer's Objections and

without allowing her to present her witnesses and evidence and
without first making findings of fact and conclusions of law. R.
89-91.
41.

Jennifer Thurston filed her Notice of Appeal on

March 14, 2000. R. 94-96.
42.

Ronald Thurston file his Petition for Dissolution of

Marriage, case number 001309, in the Lincoln County Circuit Court
of Oregon on March 20, 2000.

Addendum D.

The Proof of Service

indicates that Mr. Thurston's Oregon Petition for Dissolution of
Marriage was served on Jennifer Thurston on May 3,

2000,

by

Kimberly Dunham, with whom Mr. Thruston lives and has two children.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Utah Ex Parte Protective Order and the Protective
Order issued by the Utah Court on March 24, 1999, and April 7,
1999, and the ex parte Restraining Order to Prevent Abuse issued by
the Oregon Court on April 5,

1999, both issued temporarily to

protect Jennifer Thurston and her children from abuse by Ronald
Thurston and awarding custody of the children to Jennifer Thurston,
21

are not determinative of which court ultimately determines the
question of the

custody of the

children

in a divorce action

pursuant to the UCCJA.
An

assumption of emergency jurisdiction is an assumption

of temporary jurisdiction only.

It does not confer upon a state

the authority to make a permanent custody disposition. State in
Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (UT App. 1990).

The Oregon court

could not have taken jurisdiction under the emergency provision of
the UCCJA, ORS 109.751(1) (1999).

The children were not physically

present in Oregon.
The Oregon Court did not contact the Utah Court.

The

Oregon court ignored the fact that Jennifer Thurston had not been
served Ronald Thurston's original petition nor the motion to modify
his original petition. The Oregon court, in it's temporary abuse
proceeding,

did

not

take

evidence

upon

the

issues

of

the

appropriate jurisdiction nor did it enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law upon the question under the UCCJA.
The Utah District Court erroneously concluded that it did
not have jurisdiction in this case.
codified in Utah at Utah Code Ann.

The purpose of the UCCJA, as
Sections 78-45c-1 through

26(1992), is to direct when jurisdiction shall be exercised.

Utah

had jurisdiction under U.C.A. Section 78-45c-3. Addendum C.
The Utah District Court had jurisdiction under the UCCJA,
in the case at bar, because the children are physically present in
22

Utah and abuse had occurred,

Utah is the home state of the

children, the best interest of the children is that Utah assume
jurisdiction, the children and parents have significant connections
with

Utah

and

substantial

evidence

concerning

their

care,

protection, training, and relationships is present in Utah, and no
other state would have jurisdiction under the provisions of the
UCCJA,

and

did

not

exercise

jurisdiction

conformity with the act. U.C.A. 78-45c-3.

substantially

in

No divorce case had been

filed in Oregon. R. 86-88, Tr. pp. 5-10, Addendum D.
On December 10, 1999, when the trial court refused to
permit the Petitioner to offer evidence and witnesses regarding the
basis of jurisdiction in Utah, and the lack of jurisdiction in
Oregon, it violated the Petitioner's rights of due process. Holm v.
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 1992).
A verbatim record of the communication should have been
made and Jennifer Thurston should have been permitted notice of the
proceeding and been permitted to participate in the matter. Holm v.
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 1992);

Yost v. Johnson, 591 A.2d

1 7 8 ( Del. 19 91 ) .

The trial court should have made findings of fact and
conclusions of law upon all material issues and the failure to so
make such findings of fact is reversible error and requires remand.
Kinkella y, Baugh,

660 P.2d 233

(Utah 1983); Rules 41 (b),

52(a), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
23

and

THE OREGON COURT BAD NO JURISDICTION ONDER THE UCCJA

The

standard

of

review

upon

the

determination

of

jurisdiction is a question of law and the appellate court does not
defer to the district court but employs a correction of error
standard. Liska v. Liska,

902 P.2d 644

(UT App. 1995); Holm v.

Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 1992).
The Utah Ex Parte Protective Order and the Protective
Order issued by the Utah Court on March 24, 1999, and April 7,
1999, and the Restraining Order to Prevent Abuse issued by the
Oregon Court on April 5, 1999, both issued temporarily to protect
Jennifer Thurston and her children from abuse by Ronald Thurston
and awarding custody of the children to Jennifer Thurston, are not
determinative of which court ultimately determines the question of
the custody of the children in a divorce action pursuant to the
UCCJA.
An

assumption of emergency jurisdiction is an assumption

of temporary jurisdiction only.

It does not confer upon a state

the authority to make a permanent custody disposition. State in
Interest of D.S.K.,

792 P.2d 118

(UT App.

1990).

A temporary

order, either in the Utah abuse proceeding or in the Oregon abuse
proceeding, should continue only as long as necessary to determine
which state should make an initial custody determination. Curtis v.
Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (UT App. 1990).
Jennifer Thurston and her children returned to their
24

family home in Sterling, Utah, on January 8, 1999.

She and her

children have resided continuously in Sterling, Utah, since that
day,

have attended their schools,

treated by their doctors and

dentists, attended church, obtained counseling for abuse, and are
residing in Sterling, Utah, today.
On June 7, 1999, Ronald Thurston filed a Motion to Modify
the Restraining Order in the Oregon Court, case number 99-1558, the
case which had never been served upon Jennifer Thurston.
Although Ronald Thurston's original Petition and the
motion to modify the temporary abuse custody order had not been
served upon her, on June 24, 1999, Jennifer Thurston made a special
appearance in the spouse abuse proceeding in the Oregon Court and
challenged the jurisdiction of the Oregon Court because she had not
been served with the Petition for Restraining Order to Prevent
Abuse

under

the

Oregon

Family Abuse

Prevention Act

nor

Mr.

Thurston's motion to modify his Oregon temporary order to change
custody of the children from Jennifer to him.

She also challenged

the Oregon court's jurisdiction based upon the two prior custody
orders entered in Utah.

The Oregon court could not have taken

jurisdiction under the emergency provision of the UCCJA,
109.751 (1) (1999) Addendum C 1,
identical to U.C.A.,

ORS

(the provision is substantively

section 78-45c-3(1)(c)), which would have

allowed Oregon to take emergency jurisdiction if:
(c)) The child is physically present in this state and(i)
the child has been abondoned or (ii) it is necessary in an
25

to protect the child because he has been subjected
to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise
neglected or dependent. (Emphasis added.)

~mergency

The

children

were

not

present

in

Oregon

but

were

physically present and had been living exclusively in Utah with
their mother since January 8, 1999.
On June 24, 1999, the Oregon judge pro tern, Frederick
Bennett, modified Mr. Thurston's unserved restraining order entered
in that court on April 5, 1999, to change custody of the children
from Jennifer Thurston

to

Ronald Thurstion,

even

though

the

children were not physically present in Oregon, and in violation of
ORS 109.751(4) (1999), requiring immediate communication with the
Utah court which entered a prior custody order under the UCCJA.
The Oregon court could not exercise jurisdiction under ORS 109.757,
because Utah had a prior domestic abuse action. Addendum C 1.
The Oregon Court did not contact the Utah Court.

The

Oregon court ignored the fact that Jennifer Thurston had not been
served Ronald Thurston's original petition nor the motion to modify
his original petition. The Oregon court, in it's temporary abuse
proceeding,

did

not

take

evidence

upon

the

issues

of

the

appropriate jurisdiction nor did it enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law upon the question under the UCCJA.
In Alloway y. Duncan, 996 P.2d 1010 (Or.App. 2000), the
Court of Appeals of Oregon held that a, "Summons must be served on
the defending party pursuant to ORCP 7 D, in order for the trial
26

court to acquire personal- jurisdiction."

The Oregon appellate

court further held that, "By force of that authority, personal
service of an order entered after an action has been commenced was
not a substitute for service of summons in connection with father's
original petition for custody as a means to acquire personal
jurisdiction over mother." Id. at 1012.
The Court of Appeals of Oregon has repeatedly held that
the

right

to

receive

adequate

service

of

a

summons

is

a

"substantial right," Bishop v. OBEC Consulting Engineers, 982 P.2d
25 (1999), and that actual notice of the pendency of an action is
insufficient to excuse noncompliance with ORCP 7. Mut:phy y. Price,
886 P.2d 1047 (1994), rev. den. 894 P.2d 468 (1995).

The Oregon

court did not make findings that there was a compelling emergency
that justifies the extraordinary relief granted by the emergency
provision of the UCCJA. See, e.g., Gribkoff v. Bedford, 711 P.2d
176, 178 (Or. 1985).
UTAH' S JURISDICTION ONDER THE UCCJA

On July 12,

1999,

Jennifer Melissa Thurston filed a

Verified Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court
for Sanpete County within the State of Utah. R.l-7.

On July 14,

1999, Jennifer Thurston filed her Motion for Order to Show Cause,
Affidavit of Petitioner and thereupon the trial Court issued it's
Order to Show Cause, requesting, inter alia, custody of the parties
minor children. R.8-21.

Jennifer Thurston and her children had
27

been

residing

in

Sterling,

Utah,

for

over

six

(6),

months

immediately preceding the filing of the divorce petition.
On August 6, 1999, Ronald Thurston filed a pro se Answer
to Verified Petition for Divorce.

R.27-28.

On August

6,

1999,

Ronald Thurston filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause. R.2425.

Attached was an unauthenticated and uncertified copy of a

Modification of Family Abuse Restraining Order of the Oregon Court
dated June 25, 1999. R.26.

This order was never and has never been

served upon Jennifer Thurston,

nor has Mr.

Thurston's original

petition and motion for modification.
On September 3, 1999, a scheduling conference was held by
the

trial

court,

both

Mr.

Thurston

and

counsel

for

Jennifer

Thurston appeared, and the Utah divorce action was set for trial on
November 4, 1999. R.34, 35-36.
On

October

7,

1999,

the

Ronald

Thurston

filed,

via

fascimile, his Petition to Enforce Visitation. R.37-38.
Sometime during late October or early November of 1999,
the Oregon court in the Oregon abuse restraining order proceeding
contacted the Utah

Court.

The Utah

trial

court

unilaterally

cancelled the divorce trial date without explanation to Jennifer
Thurston.

There is nothing

in the record indicating that

this

exparte conversation occurred, or when it occurred, or the facts
and

issues

declaration

were
on

considered,

December 10,

other
1999,
28

than

that

the

trial

there had been

court's
such a

conversation. Tr. PP. 5-10.
On November 30, 1999, Jennifer Thurston filed her Motion
for Declaration of Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act. R.39-40.

The motion was supported by the

Affidavit of Jennifer Thurston. R. 41-80.

The Affidavit asserted

that Jennifer Thurston and her children had lived in Utah since
January

8,

1999,

that

Ronald Thurston

had physically abused

Jennifer Thurston and forced her to remain in Oregon by beatings
and druggings. R.
jurisdiction

in

41-44.
a

It asserted that Utah had exercised

Protective

Order

Jennifer custody of the children.

proceeding

which

awarded

The affidavit asserted that

Ronald Thurston had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by his affirmative requests for relief. R. 46.

The affidavit

identified the children's teachers, doctors, dentists, counselors,
clergy, Utah child protective service workers,

law enforcement

officers and other witnesses who reside in Utah and who would offer
evidence upon the issues of the children's present and future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships. R. 47-50.

The

Affidavit of Jennifer Thurston identified facts concerning the best
interests of the children, including their primary care and that
Ronald Thurston had physically abused Jennifer Thurston and the
children, and was living with Kimberly Dunham, with whom he had two
(2),

other

children.

R.

49-52.

The

affidavit

asserted Mr.

Thurston's misconduct by his misrepresentations in the cases R. 52.
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On

December

2,

1999,

an

unsigned,

uncertified

and

unauthenticated copy of an Order of Consolidation from an Oregon
Court with the purported date of November 12, 1999, was filed in
the trial Court. The order did not bear any Oregon court filing
stamp, certification nor authentication. R.83-84.
On December 10, 1999, a hearing was held before the trial
court

upon

Jennifer

Thurston's

Motion

for

Declaration

of

Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act. R. 85; R.137; Tr. 1-12.

Jennifer Thurston and her children

had resided continuously in Sterling, Utah, for eleven (11), months
on December 10, 1999.
Mr.

Thurston was not present at the hearing but was

represented by his counsel, Mr. Hunt. Tr. p.5.

Jennifer Thurston's

counsel asserted that Jennifer Thurston had not been served any
such order and that under the UCCJA, she is entitled to present
evidence as to the jurisdictional questions, the home state of the
children and the best interest of the children. Tr. p. 5-6. She
asserted that several witnesses were present prepared to offer
evidence on the jurisdictional question, and that the court should
consider the best interests of the children. R. 85; Tr. p.5.

The

Utah divorce court then stated that he had been in contact with the
judge in Oregon by phone and after due conversation with him the
conclusion was reached that the appropriate jurisdiction was the
state of Oregon. R. 85; Tr. p. 6.
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Jennifer Thurston asserted that she had not been served
with any documents or motions at all out of Oregon and that she is
entitled to be heard and present evidence on the question of
jurisdiction. Tr. p. 7, 9-10.

She also asserted that a record

should be made of any conversation with the Oregon court. Tr. p. 7.
Jennifer Thurston's counsel asserted that the trial court
must

make

specific

jurisdiction. Tr. p.8.

findings

as

to

the

facts

that

support

Jennifer Thurston's counsel asserted that

the children had lived in Utah for nearly one (1), year and that
the first time the jurisdictional issue was raised was by Jennifer
Thurston with the present motion. Tr. p. 8.
Jennifer Thurston's counsel asserted that there was no
divorce proceeding pending in Oregon whatsoever. Tr. p. 8.
On February 4, 2000, Ronald Thurston's counsel mailed a
proposed Order to counsel for Jennifer Thurston. R. 89-91.

On

February 11, 2000, Jennifer Thurston mailed Objections to Proposed
Order. R. 86-88.

She asserted that the trial court must receive

evidence upon the issues which are set forth in the UCCJA, at
section 78-45c-3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and that she had appeared at the
hearing with several witnesses to offer testimony upon the basis of
jurisdiction in Utah,

care,

training,

protection and personal

relationships, the significant connections the children and parents
have with Utah, and the lack of connections the children and the
parents have with Oregon, and the physical presence of the children
31

in Utah.

R. 86, 87, 88. She objected that she would have presented

evidence that Oregon was without jurisdiction pursuant to the
UCCJA,

and that she had not been served with documents giving

Oregon jurisdiction, and that no Oregon divorce case had even been
filed. R. 87.

Addendum D.

Jennifer Thurston objected that any conversation with an
Oregon judicial officer should have been made upon the record and
that a contemporaneous record of the conversation with the trial
court made. R. 87.
Jennifer Thurston objected that the trial court had not
made findings of fact and that findings should be made on the
factors determining the most convenient forum, and costs, and upon
Ronald Thurston's misconduct. R. 87.
The Utah trial court entered it's Order declaring that
the state of Oregon has jurisdiction over the matter and issues and
dismissed Jennifer Thurston's Verified Petition for Divorce on
February 22, 2000, in spite of and over the objections of Jennifer
Thurston. R. 89-91.
The trial court did not enter findings of fact,

nor

conclusions of law supporting the Order. R. 89-94.
On March 20, 2000, Ronald Thurston filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Marriage in the Lincoln County Circuit Court for the
State of Oregon which had not been served upon Jennifer Thurston.
R. 117; Addendum D.
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The Utah District Court erroneously concluded that it did
not have jurisdiction in this case.

The purpose of the UCCJA, as

codified in Utah at Utah Code Ann.

Sections 78-45c-1 through

26(1992), is to direct when jurisdiction shall be exercised.

Utah

had jurisdiction under U.C.A. Section 78-45c-3. Addendum C.
The Utah District Court had jurisdiction under the UCCJA,
in the case at bar, because Jennifer Thurston and the children had
resided continuously in Utah since January 8, 1999, a period in
excess of six (6), months prior to the commencement of the divorce
action on July 12, 1999. U.C.A. 78-45c-3(1} (a} (i}.

The children

had continuously in Utah at the time of the commencement of the
divorce proceeding and thus, the "home state" jurisdictional basis
had been met. R. 1, 44.
The

Utah

trial

court

also

had

jurisdiction

under

subsection (b), of U.C.A. 78-45c-3, because it is in the best
interest of the children that the Utah court assume jurisdiction
because the children and their parents,

Jennifer Thurston and

Ronald Thurston, have a significant connection with Utah, and there
is available in Utah substantial evidence concerning the children's
present

or

future

relationships.
evidence

concerning

protection,
Jennifer

The

care,

protection,

significant
the

Thurston's

connections

children's

training and personal
Affidavit

in
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training,

present

and

and
and

substantial
future

relationships was
support

of

her

personal

care,

shown by

motion

for

declaration of jurisdiction. R. 41-80.
Thirdly, the Utah court had jurisdiction under subsection
(c),

of

U.C.A.

78-45c-3,

because

the

Thurston

children were

physically present in Utah, and it was necessary in an emergency to
protect

the

children

because

they

had

been

subjected

to

or

threatened with mistreatment or abuse or were otherewise neglected
or dependent. R. 54-57.

The Utah District Court had entered an Ex

Parte Protective Order in case number 994600040, restraining Ronald
Thurston

from attemmpting,

committing or threatening domestic

violence and abuse against the children, ordered him to stay away
from the children's home, schools and church in Sterling, Utah, and
had prohibited him from removing the children from the state of
Utah. R. 54-57.
Lastly, based upon the record before the trial court on
December 10, 1999, and on February 22, 2000, it appeared that no
other

state

would

have

jurisdiction

under

substantially in accordance with subsections (a),

prerequisites
(b), or (c), and

it was in the best interest of the children that Utah assume
jurisdiction. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 1992).
Clearly, the Utah court had jurisdiction under the UCCJA,
section 78-45c-3.

While the court may have eventually declined to

exercise jurisdiction, it was error to do so without permitting
Jennifer Thurston a hearing as to Utah's jurisdiction and Oregon's
lack of jurisdiction.

Jennifer Thurston asserted that she had not
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been served Oregon process and she should have been permitted to
present her proof of failure of service under UCCJA, section 7845c-5.

A foreign judgment entered without jurisdiction and without

proper service of process is void and need not be accorded full
faith and credit. See, Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 99 (Utah
1986).

Moreover, U.C.A. Section 78-45c-4, provides that prior to

making a decree under the UCCJA, reasonable notice and opportunity
to be heard shall be given to the contestants.
On December 10, 1999, at the time of the hearing on the
motion for declaration of jurisdiction,

the only Oregon court

document

it

the

trial

court

had

before

was

the

Order

Consolidation filed in the trial court on December 2, 1999.
84.

This

purported order did not

make

findings

as

of

R. 83to

the

jurisdictional prerequisites of sections 78-45c-3, 4, 5, 6, or 7.
This purported order was unsigned,

uncertified~

unauthenticated and

not domesticated by it's filing under the Utah Foreign Judgment
Act, U.C.A. Section 78-22a-2(1) (1992). R. 136. Holm v. Smilowitz,
840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 1992).
Moreover, on December 10, 1999, the date of the hearing
on

Jennifer Thurston's motion pursuant

February 22,

2000,

to the UCCJA,

and on

the date of the court's Order transferring

jurisdiction to Oregon and dismissing Jennifer Thurston's divorce
petition, there was no divorce proceeding pending in the state of
Oregon. R. 46, 87; Tr. p. 8; Addendum D.
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The Utah court in this divorce action cannot transfer
jurisdiction to the Oregon temporary restraining order to prevent
abuse action, to make an ultimate determination of custody of the
Thurston children when no dissolution proceeding was pending in
Oregon.

The only dissolution action pending in either state was in

Jennifer Thurston's Verified Petition for Divorce in the Sixth
Judicial District Court which was filed at the time when the
Jennifer Thurston and her children had been in Utah for in excess
of six (6), months.

Utah was the home state of the children at the

time of the commencement of the divorce action in Utah.
U.C.A. Section 78-45c-6(1), directs that,
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its
jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the petition
a proceeding concerning custody of the child was pending in a court
of another state exercJsJng jurisdiction substantially in
conformity with this act .... {Emphasis added.)
Utah was the home state of the children at the time of
the commencement of the proceeding in Utah since the children had
lived in Sterling, Utah, for a period of in excess of six (6),
consecutive months.

Thus, Oregon could not assert jurisdiction

under ORS 109.74l{l){a),

it's "home state" provision which is

identical to U.C.A. 78-45c-3(1) (a).
Similarly,

the

Oregon

court

could

not

exercise

jurisdiction based upon the record in the trial court under ORS
109.741{1) (b), substantially identical to U.C.A. 78-45c-3(1) (b).
There was no showing in the trial court that it was in the best
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interest of the children that Oregon assume jurisdiction because
the children and parents have a significant connection with Oregon,
and

that

there

is

available

in

Oregon

substantial

concerning the children's present or future care,
training, and personal relationships.
children's

best

interest

The only

and evidence

evidence

protection,

evidence of the

concerning

their

care,

protection, training and personal relationships in the trial court
was that of Jennifer Thurston in her affidavit in support of her
motion to declare Utah the jurisdiction to determine custody. R.
39-60.
Moreover,

Oregon

was

not

exercising

substantially in conformity with the UCCJA.

jurisdiction

Jennifer Thurston had

not been served any petition, nor order, from an Oregon court in
the temporary restraining order proceeding of Ronald Thurston.
This failure of service of process was violative of UCCJA, Sections
78-45c-4, and 78-45c-5, and ORS 109.724, and 109.754.
In Alloway v. Duncan, 996 P.2d 1010 (Or.App. 2000), the
Court of Appeals of Oregon held that a, "Summons must be served on
the defending party pursuant to ORCP 7 D, in order for the trial
court

to acquire personal

jurisdiction,"...

and,

" ... personal

service of an order entered after an action has been commenced was
not a substitute for service of summons in connection with father's
original petition for custody as a means to acquire personal
jurisdiction over mother." Id. at 1012.
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In order to entertain a

dispute

a

court must

have

jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the dispute and the
individuals involved.

If a court lacks either type of jurisdiction

it has no power to entertain the suit.
717

(UT App.

1990).

substantially

in

Oregon

had

conformity with

Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d
not

exercised

the UCCJA,

jurisdiction

because Jennifer

Thurston had not been served with any Oregon petitions or orders.
The Utah trial court, should have taken jurisdiction of the custody
determination because no other action

for dissolution of the

marriage and concerning the custody of the children was pending in
another state on December 10, 1000, and on February 22, 2000, the
date of entry of the Order declaring that Oregon had jurisdiction
and dismissing

Jennifer Thurston's

divorce

petition.

Ronald

Thurston did not filed his Petition for Dissolution in the Oregon
court until March 20, 2000.

Addendum D.

THE PETITIONER' S RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED
BY THE TRIAL COURT' S FAILURE TO PERMIT HER A BEAlUNG
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THE FACTORS DETERMIN:ING JORISDICTION

Jennifer Thurston's right of due process was violated by
the trial court's failure to permit her a hearing to present
evidence on the factors determining jurisdiction.
On

July

12,

1999,

the

Jennifer

Thurston

filed

her

Verified Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court
for Sanpete County within the State of Utah, and Ronald Thurston
answered the petition requesting affirmative relief.
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No petition

for divorce had been filed in the State of Oregon at the time. R.
86-88; Addendum D.
On November 30, 1999, the Jennifer Thurston filed her
Motion for Declaration of Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.

The motion was supported by the

Affidavit of Jennifer Thurston.
Jennifer Thurston appeared at the hearing on the motion
on December 10,

1999,

with her witnesses prepared to present

evidence of the question of jurisdiction and the best interest of
the children.

Ronald Thurston did not appear at the hearing but

was represented by his counsel,

Lawrence Hunt.

No witnesses

appeared at the hearing on behalf of Mr. Thurston.
proceeding had been filed in the State of Oregon.

No divorce

Mr. Thurston's

Petition for Dissolution was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit
Court in Oregon on March 20, 2000.

Addendum D.

Jennifer Thurston attempted to call witnesses.

The trial

Court declared that it had spoken with an officer of the Court of
the State of Oregon. Tr. pp. 5-10.

No record had been made of the

conversation between the Utah Court and the Oregon Court. R. 1-136.
The trial Court refused to allow Jennifer Thurston to present
witnesses and evidence, declared that Oregon had jurisdiction and
summarily dismissed Jennifer Thurston's divorce action. R. 89-91.
On February 4, 2000, the Respondent's counsel submitted
a proposed Order.

R. 89-91.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
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Law were not submitted with the proposed Order nor entered by the
trial court. R. 1-136.
On

February

11,

2000,

Jennifer

Objections to Proposed Order. R. 86.
the trial Court,

Thurston

filed

her

The objections stated that

in order to determine whether the bases of

jurisdiction in this state exist must receive evidence upon the
issues which are set forth in the UCCJA, at section 78-45c-3. R.
86-88.
Jennifer Thurston had appeared at the hearing on December
10, 1999, intending to call several witnesses to offer testimony
upon the basis of jurisdiction including the home state of the
children at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, the
best interests of the children, and the significant connections the
children and parents have with the State of Utah, and the lack of
significant connections the children and the parties have with the
State of Oregon.

She was prepared to offer witnesses and testimony

that the children were physically present in this state and the
facts showing emergencies, abuse and maltreatment of the children
and the Petitioner by Ronald Thurston.

Jennifer Thurston had

present in court several witnesses who would have testified as to
the children's present and future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships.

She would have proved that Oregon was

without jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA, and other facts showing
that

she had not

been served Oregon documents giving Oregon
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jurisdiction, and that no Oregon divorce case had ever been filed.
R. 86-88.

She objected that the trial court had jurisdiction over
the parties and could not dismiss the divorce action because the
she and the children had been residents of Sanpete County within
the State of Utah for over six (6}, months at the time the divorce
proceeding was filed and that no divorce proceeding was pending in
Oregon. R. 86-88.
Jennifer Thurston objected that she should have been
given the opportunity to be heard and present witnesses and other
evidence pursuant to UCCJA, sections 78-45c-4 and 5, and findings
of fact
findings

should have been made.
of

fact

should

have

R.
been

86-88.
made

She objected that
on

the

factors

in

determining the most convenient forum, the best interests of the
children, the horne state, the Respondent's misconduct, costs and
other material factors in determining which state has jurisdiction.
R. 86-88.
The trial Court executed and entered the Respondent's
proposed Order on February 22,

2000,

despite the Petitioner's

objections and without allowing the Petitioner to present her
witnesses and evidence and without first making findings of fact
and conclusions of law. R. 89-91.
"The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic
fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the
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case and just to the parties involved." Wiscombe v .. Wiscoffibe, 7 4·4
P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Rupp v. Grantsville City,
610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)).

~one

of the fundamental requisites

of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard."
A foreign judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the
Petitioner, and without proper service of process should not be
accorded full faith nor credit in Utah.
96, 99 (Utah 1986) .

Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d

The Petitioner, if permitted a hearing upon

jurisdiction, would have proved that she had never been served with
Oregon process and that no divorce petition had been filed or was
pending in the State of Oregon on December 10,

1999,

nor on

February 22, 2000, nor on March 14, 2000. R. 89, 95, 134, 136.
Ronald Thurston's divorce action was filed in the Lincoln
County Circuit Court, in Oregon on March 20, 2000, as case number
001309. See, Addendum D (Ronald Thurston's Petition for Dissolution
of Marriage) .

The Utah trial court could not, on December 10,

1999, nor on February 22, 2000,

transfer jurisdiction over the

divorce

to

and

custody pxoceeding

a

non-existent

dissolution

proceeding in Oregon.
If the trial court had permitted Jennifer Thurston to
call witnesses and present evidence she would have called the
witnesses named in her affidavit filed in support of her motion and
these witnesses would have testifed as to the facts supporting the
jurisdictional basis' in Utah.

Ronald Thurston was not present at
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the hearing personally, but appeared by his counsel.

No witnesses

were present on behalf of Mr. Thurston and the facts which would
have been produced by Jennifer Thurston,

as set forth in her

affidavit in support of the motion, were uncontroverted.
On December 10, 1999, when the trial court refused to
permit the Petitioner to offer evidence and witnesses regarding the
basis of jurisdiction in Utah, and the lack of jurisdiction in
Oregon, it violated the Petitioner's rights of due process. Holm v.
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992}.
Jennifer Thurston challenges, and challenged below, the
jurisdiction of the State of Oregon over her and the children.
has

She

challenged Oregon's in personam jurisdiction and Oregon's

subject matter jurisdiction.
App. 1990}.

Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (UT

She should be permitted to present her witnesses and

evidence showing the failure of service of process and the proper
forum. Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1991).
The Order declaring jurisdiction in Oregon and dismissing
the Utah divorce action was plain and manifest error.

The Order

should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to the trial
court

with

instructions

to

permit

the

Petitioner

to present

evidence upon the basis of jurisdiction set forth in the UCCJA.
THE FAILURE TO MAKE A RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION
BE'lWEEN THE OREGON COURT AND THE UTAH COURT IS ERROR

On July 12,

1999,

the Petitioner filed her Verified

Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court for
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Sanpete County within

the State of Utah,

and the Respondent

answered the petition requesting affirmative relief.

No petition

for divorce had been filed in the State of Oregon at the time.
Addendum D.
On November 30, 1999, the Petitioner filed her Motion for
Declaration of Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act which was supported by her affidavit showing the
best interest of the children, their home state, facts regarding
emergency jurisdiction, failure of service of process, identifying
witnesses, abuse by Ronald Thurston, the significant connections
the

children

and

parents

have

with

the

State

of

Utah,

and

substantial evidence concerning the children's present and future
care,

protection,

training and personal relationships,

and the

convenience of forum. R. 41-80.
Sometime during late October or early November of 1999,
the Oregon court in it's restraining order proceeding contacted the
Utah Court.

The Utah trial court unilaterally cancelled the trial

date without explanation to Jennifer Thurston. There is nothing in
the record indicating that this exparte conversation occurred, or
when it occurred, or what was considered other than the trial
court's declaration on December 10, 1999, that there had been such
a conversation. Tr. pp. 5-10.
The Petitioner appeared at the hearing on the motion on
December 10, 1999, with her witnesses prepared to present evidence

44

of th·e question of juri-sdiction and the best interest of the
children,

their training,

connections with Utah.

care, protection and the significant
The Respondent did not appear at the

hearing but was represented by his counsel, Lawrence Hunt.

No

witnesses appeared at the hearing on behalf of the Respondent.

No

divorce proceeding had been filed, nor has been filed, in the State
of Oregon. R. 85, 86-89.
The Petitioner attempted to call witnesses.

The trial

Court refused to permit evidence and declared that it had spoken
with an officer of the Court of the State of Oregon and that
jurisdiction had been determined to be in Oregon.

Tr. pp. 5-10.

In State ex rel. D.S.K. v. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118 (UT App.
1990),

this

Court

recognized

the

importance

of

at

least

a

contemporaneous written record of the communication between two
courts concerning the determination of jurisdiction by either court
under the UCCJA.

Id.

at

127 n. 9.

Without a

record of the

proceeding it is impossible for an appellate court to review the
discussion between the Oregon court and the Utah court.

The

appellate court nor Jennifer Thurston know the factors, evidence
and reasoning used by the two courts to make a jurisdictional
determination. Briggs v. Holcqmb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (UT App. 1987).
A verbatim record of the communication should have been
made and Jennifer Thurston should have been permitted notice of the
proceeding and been permitted to participate in the matter. Yost v.
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Johnson, 591 A.2d 178

{De-l,

19.'H) .

The scheduling and notice of a

hearing between courts and parties is not burdensome.
Jennifer Thurston was prejudiced by the denial of the
opportunity to prove to either court that she had not been served
with Mr. Thurston's Oregon petition and Restraining Order.

She was

prejudiced because she was denied the opportunity to offer evidence
of the most convenient forum, the home state of the children, the
best

interest of the children,

and the unclean hands of Mr.

Thurston. See, e.g., Holm v. Smilowitz,

840 P.2d 157

(UT App.

1992), quoting Wyatt v. Falhsing, 396 So.2d 1069 (Ala.Civ. App.
1981), finding a denial of due process because the mother was not
given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
"Ordinarily,

the

record

consists

of

a

verbatim

transcription or recording of the entire proceeding." Liska v.
Liska, 902 P.2d 644 (UT App. 1995). See Utah Code Ann. Section 7856-1.1 (1992); Utah Code Jud. Admin. R3-304(3) (A).
It is impossible for an appellate court to review the
action of the trial court, and the basis for conclusions as to
which state has jurisdiction, the best interest of the children and
which

forum

is

most

appropriate,

without

any

record

of

the

proceedings in the trial court. See Briggs y. Holcoffib, 740 P.2d
281, 283 (UT App. 1987).
In the instant action there is no indication in the
record of when, or if, there was a conversation between an Oregon
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judicial officer and the district court.

Jennifer Thurson and the

appellate court can only guess when the communication occured,
what the substance of the communication was, and the factors relied
upon by the trial court for making it's determination that Oregon
is the more appropriate forum,

and the basis for jurisdiction.

Jennifer Thurston and this appellate Court are prevented from
determining and reviewing the facts and conclusions upon which the
action transferring jurisdiction to Oregon was based.
The Order transferring jurisdiction to the State of
Oregon and dismissing the Utah divorce action was manifest error.
The Order should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to
the trial court with instructions to permit Jennifer Thurston to
present testimony and evidence upon the basis of jurisdiction set
forth in the UCCJA,

that any communication between an Oregon

judicial officer and the Utah court be upon the record, and that
the Petitioner should have notice of the communication and be
permitted to participate in the communication.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE
FDmiNGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The trial court should have made factual findings and
conclusions of law upon the basis' of jurisdiction in the State of
Utah in accordance with Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45c-3, and
the factors used in determining the most convenient forum,

or

declining jurisdiction on findings of inconvenient forum, pursuant
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to Section 78-45c-7.

The failure of the trial court to make such

findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the dismissal of the
divorce action is plain and manifest error.

U.C.A. section 78-

45c-7(1), and (2), specifically provides that the trial court must
make findings regarding the convenience of forum, and the most
appropriate forum. Addendum C 2.
Moreover,
determining

if

it

under
is

an

U.C.A.

section

inconvenient

forum,

78-45c-7(3),
the court

in
shall

consider if it is in the interest of the children that another
state assume jurisdiction, taking into account, inter alia, the
home state of the children, the connection of another state with
the

children

and

their

family

and

the

contestants,

whether

substantial evidence concerning the children's present or future
care, protection,

training,

and personal relationships is more

readily available in another state, any agreement upon another
forum which is no less appropriate, and whether the exercise of
jurisdiction by the court of this state would contravene any of the
purposes stated in U.C.A. section 78-45c-1.

Jennifer Thurston

objected that the trial court had failed to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law regarding jurisdiction. R. 86-88.
The appellate court, without adequate findings of fact
and conclusions of law, has no ability to review the basis for the
trial court to find that Utah was without jurisdiction, that Oregon
had jurisdicition, and the factors used in determining the most
48

convenient forum.
The only evidence before the trial court on December 10,
1999, was that of Jennifer Thurston.
92

In Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d

(UT App. 1988), this Court quoted the Utah Supreme Court in

Acton v.

Deliran,

737

P.2d 396

(Utah 1987),

when it stated,

"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues
is reversible error unless the facts in the record are 'clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor
of the judgment.' [Such findings]

'should be sufficiently detiled

and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" See

also,

Kinkella v.

Baugh,

660

P.2d 233

(Utah

1983)

requiring

reversal and remand.
The failure of the trial court to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law supporting it's judgment was plain, manifest
and reversible error.

This action should be remanded to the trial

court with instructions to enter findings of fact and conclusions
of law, based upon the affidavit of Jennifer Thurston, and judgment
that the State of Utah has jurisdiction upon said facts.
CONCLUSION

The Oregon court was without jurisdiction to enter a
permanent custody order.
UCCJA, 78-45c-1, et seq.
present evidence.

Utah has jurisdiction pursuant to the
Jennifer Thurston should be permitted to

Any communication between the Oregon Court and
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the Utah court should bPr upon the record and notice and opportunity
to be heard provided Jennifer Thurston.

The trial court should

make findings of fact and conclusions of law upon the facts and
issues required under the UCCJA.

This matter should be reversed

eptember, 2000.

t,

ston

I hereby certify that on this 21st day of September, 2000, I
served upon and mailed, postag
two (2), true and correct c
Appellant to Ronald Thurston, at
97303.
/

50

ADDENDUM

A.

Order declaring Oregon's jurisdiction on February 22, 1999.

B.

Transcript of hearing on jurisdiction on December 10, 1999.

C.
D.

1. Oregon UCCJA, ORS 109.701 et seq.
2. Utah UCCJA, U.C.A. 78-45c-3 et seq.
Ronald Thurston's Oregon Petition for Dissolution filed March
20, 2000, in Lincoln County Circuit Court, case number 001309,
Return of Service by Kimberly Dunham of May 3, 2000.
Minutes of June 5, 2000, hearing.

LAWRENCE H. HUNT (3934)
Attorney for Respondent
195 North 100 East, Suite 205
Richfield, Utah 84701
(435) 896-4424

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JENNIFER MELISSA THURSTON,

ORDER
Petitioner,
vs.
RONALD THURSTON,
Respondent.

Civil No. 994600102
JUDGE LOUIS G. TERVORT

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 1Oth day of
December, 1999, upon the Motion of the Petitioner seeking a declaration of jurisdiction
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The Petitioner appearing in person
and being represented by her attorney, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and the Respondent appearing
in person and being represented by his attorney, Lawrence H. Hunt. The court having heard
argument by counsel for the parties, having had conversation with the Court in the State of
Oregon, and the above-entitled Court being fully advised in the premises, now makes the
following Order:

Thurston vs. Thurston
Order
Civil No. 994600102

Page2

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The State of Oregon has jurisdiction over this matter and all issues therein.

2.

The Court hereby dismisses all matters concerning the above-entitled action.

DATED this

I5{

day of February, 2000.

BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this !:\:l:h day of February, 2000.
Andrew B. Berry
Attorney at Law
62 West Main Street
P.O. Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600

NOTICE
The above referenced parties will PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Rule 4504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, the undersigned will submit the foregoing
to the Judge of the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpete County for signature upon the
expiration of five (5) days from the date of mailing of this Notice unless a written objection
is filed with the Court and Counsel for the Respondent prior to that time. Please govern
yourself accordingly.

UHiuiNAL
IN THE sixTH JUDICIAL oisTRic;r0 S~!r!G Afl1 9 57
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH
KR15 ~.
JENNIFER MELISSA THURSTON,
Petitioner,

vs.

BY.J~

)

..Lri:·~-

r• .-r"'! !-•J

·. . .- ·.J''

)
)
)

) CASE NO. 994600102 DA
)
)
)

RONALD THURSTON,

)
Respondent,
_____________________________
)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE LOUIS G. TERVORT

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SANPETE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
MANTI, UTAH

84642

REPORTER' S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

DECEMBER 10, 1999

TRANSCRIBED BY:
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10:00 A.M.
lOTH DECEMBER 1999
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

1

2
MR. HUNT:

3

4

too, Your Honor.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. HUNT:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. HUNT:

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. HUNT:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. HUNT:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. HUNT:

(Inaudible) .
Let's take that up right now,-Okay,
--if you have no objection.
(Inaudible)--Andrew Berry.
Mr. Berry.

Ah, the last I heard.
He indicated you were in it.
I haven't got an appearance filed yet.

THE COURT:

I thought we had an order out of Oregon

that they have jurisdiction in this matter.

19

MR. HUNT:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. HUNT:

22

schedule the hearing, Judge.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. HUNT:

25

Is he still involved in

just recently got--(Inaudible).

17

18

Stay here.

Oh, good.

that?

13

16

The only--I'm on the Thurston matter,

ask me.

You do.

There is.

So why are we here?
An interesting question.

I didn't

You--ha-ha, ha-ha, ha.
You know me.

It's never my fault.

I'm always innocent.

"Honest, Dear. "

Just

Ha-ha, ha-ha,

I

1

ha.

2

(Mr. Berry entered courtroom.)

3

THE COURT:

4

Mr.

Be~ry,

are you involved in the

Thurston matter any longer?

5

MR. BERRY:

Oh, of course.

6

THE COURT:

Okay.

7

That's right.

And you represent--

8

MR. HUNT:

9

THE COURT:

10

Oh, you represent Melissa.

Ron Thurston.
Ron Thurston.

Okay.

Let's hear that.

Mr. Berry, !--there's an order out of Oregon from

11

the Judge there that that court has jurisdiction under the

12

Uniform Child Custody Act, I guess it is.

13

MR. BERRY:

We--we--I haven't seen any order to that

14

effect at all.

15

course, under the UCCJA we're entitled to present evidence as

16

to the jurisdictional questions and the best interests of the

17

children and the home state of the children.

18

She hasn't been served that order;

And of

I--I understand that the court--and I do have

19

witnesses present--that I--I don't know that today's to do

20

it--the day to do it, given your calendar.

21

THE COURT:

I don't think it is.

22

MR. BERRY:

We have several witnesses and they have

23

a lot of evidence that we'd like to present on the

24

jurisdictional question.

25

interests of the children and, of course, where the case was

The court should consider the best

1

filed and where these folks have lived.

2

lived in Utah--

3
4

THE COURT:

MR. HUNT:

that had already been

I think that--that hearing should have

taken place, if it didn't take place in Oregon; not here.

7
8

tho~ght

determined in Oregon.

5
6

I

These children have

MR. BERRY:

We've never been served anything about a

hearing in Oregon.

9

THE COURT:

Well I don't know what you may have been

10

served, but I have been in contact with the Judge ln Oregon by

11

phone and after due conversation with him we came to the

12

conclusion that the appropriate jurisdiction and determination

13

of jurisdiction should be made in the state of Oregon.

14

was going to prepare an order to that effect.

And he

15

MR. HUNT:

16

MR. BERRY:

Well I--I haven't seen any order to that

18

THE COURT:

What do you have there, Mr. Hunt?

19

MR. HUNT:·

17

20

effect.

me check.

MR. BERRY:

22

MR. HUNT:

24
25

Just if I may approach Your Honor.

I may have an extra copy.

21

23

He did.

Do you have a copy?
I just assumed you had one.

I don't

think I have an extra copy.
THE COURT:
consolidation.

Well that appears to be an order of

Let

1

MR. HUNT:

As well as jurisdiction.

2

THE COURT:

Correct.

3

MR. BERRY:

Urn, then I--I think that we're entitled

4

to have our case heard and present evidence as to the

5

jurisdictional question.
THE COURT:

6

7

Suppose I did that and Oregon did that

and we have--and both come to different conclusions.

8
9

There's no domestic proceedings.

MR. BERRY:
jurisdiction.

Well if Oregon declared itself the

I mean we haven't even--we haven't even been

10

able to present evidence in Oregon.

11

with any documents or motions at all out of Oregon or at least

12

entitled to be heard.

13

THE COURT:

She hasn't been served

I understand, Mr. Berry.

But I have

14

conferred with Judge Bennett in Oregon and he I talked about

15

it and we carne to agreement and from what we could see that

16

the jurisdiction would best be determined in Oregon and that's

17

the ruling of this court.

18

(Whereupon Bench phone rang.)

19

THE COURT:

20

(Court hung up Bench phone.)

21

MR. BERRY:

Hello.

No, it is not.

Urn, the--also, Your Honor, the statute

22

requires that that conversation with Judge Bennett in Oregon

23

be, ah, a record be made of that conversation and for this

24

court--

25

THE COURT:

You'll have to check with Judge Bennett

1

on that.

2

MR. BERRY:

And this--this court makes specific

3

findings as to the facts that's supporting jurisdiction one

4

way or the other.

5

Oregon whatsoever.

6

me and that's with this motion.

7

in Utah.

8

we filed this--

11

The first time the issue was raised was by
And these children have lived

In two weeks it will be a year.

9
10

There's no divorce proceeding pending in

THE COURT:
wasn't it?

And so at the time

The matter was filed up there in June,

Or-MR. BERRY:

A protective order proceeding was filed

12

up there by Mrs. Thurston in June.

13

had taken jurisdiction in March several months on a protective

14

order proceeding.

15

That was after this court·

And then we had several--(Inaudible)--

THE COURT:

But you didn't have a year of

16

jurisdiction at that point.

The children hadn't been there

17

and that was the basis of ruling--of my coming to the

18

conclusion with Judge Bennett that that was the appropriate

19

place for it to be--for it to be in Oregon was the fact that

20

at the time that hearing was scheduled and at the time it was

21

filed and heard here in Sanpete the children had not been here

22

in six months.

23

MR. BERRY:

In March, you're saying.

24

THE COURT:

Yes.

25

MR. BERRY:

And I think that that's true.

But one

1

of the bases of jurisdiction under the UCCJA is that a risk of

2

injury to the children.

3

protective order based upon ·physical abuse by Mr. Thurston

4

that occurred here in March.

5

And this court had issued a

COURT RULING

6

THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Berry, this is the ruling.

7

I've given the jurisdiction to Oregon.

8

that's appropriate, you can appeal my decision.

9

through with it here until somebody does something in Oregon

10

If you don't think
But I am

to get it back here in my hands.

11

MR. BERRY:

Okay.

12

THE COURT:

That's the ruling.

13

MR. BERRY:

And so I take it that Mr. Hunt will

14

prepare an order to that effect.

15

THE COURT:

I assume he will, if he's doing his job.

16

MR. BERRY:

And then may I approach the court at

17

that time to request under Rule 62 a stay of that order

18

pending--

19
20

THE COURT:

You can follow the rules and make your

application and we'll go from there.

21

MR. BERRY:

Thank you, Your Honor:

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MR. BERRY:

Urn, so, ah, we've--we won't be permitted

24
25

to present witnesses on the question today?
THE COURT:

Not today, no.

You said you weren't

1

ready anyway.

2

MR. BERRY:

Well I--

3

THE COURT:

I

MR. BERRY:

We have the witnesses here and all,

THE COURT:

No.

9

MR. BERRY:

All right.

10

THE COURT:

Thank you.

11

(The above entitled proceedings were completed.)

4

get to it.

5
6

but--

7

8

meaTh you didn't think we were gonna

I'm not gonna hear any evidence on

it.
Thank you, Your Honor.

12
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RIGHTS AND RELATIONSHIPS OF PARENT AND CHILD
contract for these necessities due to perceived legal limitations affecting contracts
with minors. The purpose of this legislation
is to address those limitations.
(2} For purposes of this section. "minor"
means an unemancipated and unmarried person who is living apart from the person's
parent, parents or legal guardian, and who is
either:
fa) Sixteen or 17 years of age;
(b) Under 16 years of age and the parent
of a child or childr~n who are living in the
physical custody of the person; or
(c) Under 16 years of age, pregnant and
expecting the birth of a child who will be
living in the physical custody of the person.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, a minor may contract for the necessities. Df a residential dwelling unit and for
utility services to that unit. Such a contract
is binding upon the minor and cannot be
voided ·or disatrrrmed by the minor based
upon the minor's age or status as a minor.
t4J The consent of the parent or legal
guardian of such minor shall not be neces·
sary to contract for a residential dwelling.
unit or utility services to that unit. The parent or legal guardian of such minor shall not
be liahle under a contract by that minor for
a residential dwelling unit or for utility services to thnt unit unless the parent or.
guardian is a party to the minor's contract,
or enters another contract, for the purpose
of acting- as- guazantm of the minor's debt:

[1993 c.369 §29]

109.700 [1973 c.375 §25; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55)

UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION- ANU
ENFORCEMENT ACT
(General- P1 owisions)109.701 Short title. ORS 109.701 to
109.834- may be- cited as the- Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.
[1999 e.649 §l}

Note: 109.701 to 109.834 were enacted into law by
the Legislative Assembly but were not added to or made
a part of ORS chapter 109 or any series therein by legislative action. See Preface to Oregon Revised Statutes
for further explanation.

l69;7M Deiarltions·fur·ORS 109".701 to
109.834. As used in ORS 109.701 to 109.834:
(1} "Abandoned" means- left without pro-

vision for reasonable and necessary care or
supervision.
(2) "Child" means an individual who has
not attained 18 years of age.
(3) "Child custody determination" means
a jud~ent, decree or other order of a court
providing for the legal custody, physical custody, parenting time or visitation with reTitle 11

109.704

spect
to
a
child.
"Child
custody
determination" includes a permanent, temporary, initial and modification order. "Child
custody determination" -does not include an
order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.
(4) "Child custody proceeding" means a
proceeding in which legal custody, physical
custody, parenting time or visitation with
respect to a child is an issue. "Child custody
proceeding" includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of
parental rights and protection from domestic
violence in which the issue may appear.
"Child custody proceeding" does not include
a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency,
contractual emancipation or enforcement under ORS 109.774 to 109.827.
(5) "Commencementn means the filing of
the first pleading in a proceeding.
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized
under the Jaw of a state. to establish, enforce
or modify a child custody determination.
(7) "Home state" means the state in
which a child lived with a parent or a person
acting as · a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In
the case of a child less than six months of
age, "home state" means the state in which
the child· lived from- birth with any of the
persons mentioned. Any temporary absence
of any of the mentioned persons is part of
the period.
(8) "Initial determination" means the
first child custody determination concerning
a particular child.
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that
makes a child custody determination for
which enforcement is sought under ORS
109.701 to 109.834.
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in
which a child custody determination is made.
( 11) "Modification" ·means a child custody determination that changes, replaces,
supersedes or is otherwise made after a previaus .. determination concerning the same
child, whether or not itis made by the court
that made the previous determination.
(lZ) "Person" means an individual. corporation, public corporation, business trust,
estate, trust, partnership, limited liability
company, association, joint venture, government or a governmental subdivision, agency
or instrumentality, or any other legal or
commercial entity.
(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a
person, other than a parent, who:
(a) Has physical custody of the child or
has had physical custody for a period of six
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consecutive months, including any temporary
absence, within one year immediately before
the commencement of a child custody proceeding; and(b) Has been awarded legal custody by a
court or claiin£ a. right to legal .custody . Wlder the law of this state.
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a child.
(15) "State" means a state of the United
States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
the United States Virgin Islands or any territory- or insulaz pyssession snbject ·to· the
jurisdiction of the United States.
(16.} "Tribe" mean& aa Indian tribe or
band, or Alaskan Native village, that is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
(17) "Warrant" means an order issued by
a court authorizing.. law enforcement officers
to take physical custody of a child. (1999 c.649
§21

Note: See note under 109.701.

109.707 Proceedings governed by other
law. ORS 109.701 to 109.834 do not govern a
proceeding pertaining to the authorization of
emergeru:y. medWal care fGr a child. [1999. di4S

(3) A court of this state need not apply
ORS 109.701 to 109.834 if the child custody
law of a foreign country violates fundamental
principles of human rights. [1999 c.649 §51
Note: See note Wlder 109.701.

109.717 Effect of ehild custody determination. A child custody determination
mo.dc by a court of this state that has jurisdiction under ORS 109.701 to 109.834 binds
all persons who have been served in accordance with the laws of this state or notified
in accordance with ORS 109.724 or who have
submitted to ·the juris(liction of the court,
and who have been given an opportunity to
be heard. As to those persons, the determination is conciusive as to all decided issues
of law and fact except to the extent the determination is modified. [1999 c.649 §61
Note: See note under 109.701.
109.'r.!n [ 1973 C-375 §§1..23; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55]

109.721 Priority. If a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under ORS
109.701 to 109.834 is raised in a child custody
proceeding, the question, upon request of a
party, must be given priority on the calendar
and handled expeditiously. [1999 e.649 §71
N&te: See Ilole- under 109.701.

§3]

109.724 Notice to persons outside
state. (1) Notice required for the exercise of
jurisdiction when a person is outside this
1999 c.649 §55]
state may be given in a manner prescribed
ltl9;7U · Application- to Indian· tribes; by the law of this state for service of process
(1) A child custody proceeding that pertains or by the law of the state in which the serto an Indian child as defined in the Indian vice is· made. Notice JPUSt be given in a
Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), is manner reasonably calculated to give actual
not subject to ORS 109.701 to 109.834 to the notice but may be by publication if other
extent that the proceeding is governed by the · means are not effective.
Indian Child Welfare Act.
(2) Proof of service may be made in the
(2.) A. court of this state. shall treat a..
tribe as if it were a state of the United manner prescribed by the law of this state
States for the purpose of applying ORS or by the law of the state in which the service is made; If serv:ice is made by mail,
I09.70T.to I09:m.
proof of service may be a receipt signed by
(3) A child custody determination made
the addressee or other evidence of delivery
by a tribe under factual circumstances in
to the addressee.
substantial conformity with the jurisdictional
(3) Notice is not required for the exercise
standards of ORS 109.701 to 109.834 must be
recognized and enforced under ORS 109.774 of jurisdiction with respect to a person who
submits to the jurisdiction of the court. [1999
to 109.827. [1999 c.649 §4J
Note: See note under 109.701.
109.710 [1973 c.375 §2; 1997 c.707 §23; repealed by

Note! See note under 109.701.

e.649 §81

Note: See note under 109.701.
109..714 International- applkation. of..
ORS 109.701 to 109.834. (1) A court of this
109.727 Appearance and limited im·
state shall treat a foreign coWttry as if it munity. (I) A party to a child custody prowere a state of the United States for the ceeding, including a modification proceeding,
purpose of applying ORS 109.701 to 109.771.
or a petitioner or respondent in a proceeding
t2) Except- as- otherwise provided· in · sulr to enforce or register ~ child custody detersection (3> of this section, a child custody mination, is not subject. to personal jurisdicdetermination made in a foreign country un- tion in this state for another proceeding or
der factual circumstances in substantial con- purpose solely by reason of having particformity with the jurisdictional standards of ipated, or of having been physically present
ORS 109.701 to 109.834 must be recognized for the purpose of participating, in the proceeding.
and enforced under ORS 109.774 to 109.827.

Title 11
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(2) A persGn who is subject to personal
jurisdiction in this state on a basis other
than physical presence is not immune from
service of process in this state. A party
present in this state who is subject to the
jurisdiction of another state is not immune
from service of process allowable under the
laws of that state.
(3) The immunity granted by subsection
(1) of this section does not extend to civil
litigation based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under ORS 109.701
to 109.834 committed by an individual while
present in this state. [1999 c.649 §91
Note: See note under 109.701.

109.730 [1973 c.375 §3; repealed by 1999 c.649 §551

109.731
Communication
between
courts. (1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning. a proceeding . arising under ORS
109.701 to 109.834.
(2) The court may allow the parties to
participate in the communication. If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the
opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is
made.
(3) Communication between courts on
schedules, calendars, court records and simi·
lar matters may occur without informing the
parties. A record. need .not be made of the
communication.
(4) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, a record must be
made of a communication under this section.
'l'he parties must be- informed promptly of th~
communication and granted access to the re~
cord.
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is inscribed on
a tangible medium or that is stored in an
electronic or other medium and is retrievable
in· perceivable form. (1999 c-.649 §101
Note: See note under 109.701.

100..734 ·Taking testimony · in another
state. ( 1) In addition to other procedures
available to a party, a party to a child custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in another state,
including· testimony of the parties and the
child, by deposition or other means allowable
in this state for testimony taken in another
state. The court on its own motion may order
that the testimony of a person be taken in
anothe-r sta~ ·and may prescribe the manner
in which and the terms upon which the testimony is taken.
(2) A court of this state may permit an
individual residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by telephone. audiovisual
Title 11

109.741

means or other electronic means before a
designated court or at another location in
that state. A court of this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an appropriate location for the deposition
or testimony.
(3) Documentary evidence transmitted
from another state to a court of this state by
technological means that does not produce
an original writing may not be excluded from
evidence on an objection based on the means
of transmission. [1999 c.649 §111
Note: See note under 109.701.

109.737 Cooperation between courts;
preservation of records. ( 1) A court of this
state may request the appropriate court of
another state to:
(a) Hold an evidentjary hearing;
(b) Order a person to produce or give evidence pursuant to procedures of that state;
(c) Order that an evaluation be made
with respect to the custody of a child involved in a pending proceeding;
(d) Forward to the court of this state a
certified copy of the transcript of the record
of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented and any evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and
(e) Order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having physical custody of the child tri appear in the proceeding
with or without the child.
{2) Upon request of a court of another
state, a court of this state may hold a hearing or enter an order described in subsection
(1) of this section.
(3) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under subsections
(1) and (2) of this section may be assessed
against the parties according to the law of
this state.
(4) A court of this· state shall preserve
the pleadings, . orders, decrees, records of
hearings, evaluations and other pertinent records with respect to a child custody proceeding for the time required by the
retention schedule adopted under ORS 8.125
(11). The retention schedule shall require re·
tention at least until t.he child attains 18
years of age. Upon appropriate request by a
court or law enforceme11t official of another
state, the court shall forward a certified copy
of those records. [1999 c.649 §121
Note: See note under 109.701.

109.740 (1973 c.375 §4; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55]

(Jurisdiction)
109.741 Initial child custody jurisdic·
tion. (1) Except as otherwise provided in
ORS 109.751, a court of this state has juris-
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diction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
(a) This state is the home state of the
child on the date of the commencement of
the proceeding, or was the home state of the
child within six months before the commeneement of ·~ proeeeding and the child
is absent from this state but a parent or
person acting as a parent continues to live
in this state;
(b) A court of another state does not
have jurisdiction under subsection (lXa) of
this section, or a court of the home state of
the·child hM declined to exercise· jurisdiction
on the ground that this state is the more
appropriate forum under ORS 109.761 or
109.764, and:
(A) The child and the child's parents, or
the child and at least one parent or a person
acting as a parent, have a significant con~tion with. this. state other than mere
physical presence; and
(B) Substantial evidence ia available in
this state concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships;
(c) All courts having jurisdiction under
subsection (l){a) or (b) of this section have
declined t<t exercise· jurisdiction · on the
ground that a court of this state is the more
appropriate forum to detennine the custody
of the child under ORS 109.761 or 109.764; or
(d) No court of any other state would
have jurisdiction under the criteria specified
in subsection (lXa), (b) or (c) of this section.
(2) Subsection UJ of this section is the
exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a
child.. custody determination. hy .a cnurt. of
this state.
{3) Physical presence of, or personal j1,1·
risdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody
cfetermination. 11999 c.649 §131
Note: See note under 109.701.

109.744 Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. (1) Except as otherwise provided in
ORS 109:751, a court of this· state· that basmade a child custody determination consistent with ORS 109.741 or 109.747 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the
determination until:
(a) A court of tliis state determines that
neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a
parent have a significant connection with
thi& state -and- that substantial evidenee i&-n~>
longel' available in this state concerning the
child's care, protection, training and personal
relationships; or
(b) A court of this state or a court of
another state determines that the child, the
Title 11-

child's parents and any person acting as a
parent do not presently reside in this state.
(2) A court of this state that has made a
child custody determination and does not
have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under
this section may modify that determination
only if the court has jurisdiction to make an
initial determination under ORS 109.741.
11999 c.649 §14}

Note: See note under 109.701.

109.747 Jurisdiction to modify deter·
mination. Except as otherwise provided in
ORS 109.751, a court of this state may not
modify a child custody determination made
by a court of another state unless a court of
this state has jurisdiction to make an initial
detennination under ORS 109.741 ClXa) or (b)
and:
(1) The court of the other state determines that it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under ORS 109.744 or
that a court of this state would be a more
convenient forum under ORS 109.761; or
(2) A court of this state or a court of the
other state determines that the child, the
child's parents and any person acting as a
parent do not presently reside in the other
state. [1999 c.649 §15)
Note: See note under 109.701.
109.'150 [1973 c.375 §5; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55]

109.751 Temporary emergency jurisdiction. (1) A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdif.tion if the child is
present in this state and the child has been
abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency
to protect the child because the child, or a
sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to
or threatened· with mistreatment or abuse.
(2) If there is no previous child custody·
determination that is. entitled to be enforced
under ORS 109.701 to 109.834 and a child·
custody proceeding has not been commenced
in a court of a state having jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.747, a child custody
determination · made · under this section remains in effect until an order is obtained.
from a court of a state having jurisdiction
under ORS 109.741 to 109.747. If a child custody proceeding has not been or i::; not com•
menced in a court of a state having
jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.747, a
child custody determination made under this
section becomes a final determination if the
determination so provides and this state becomes the home state of the child.
(3} If there is a previous child custody
determination that is entitled to be enforced
under ORS 109.701 to 109.834, or a child
custody proceeding has been commenced in
a court of a state having jurisdiction undei:.
ORS 109.741 to 109.747, any order issued by
a court of this state under this section must
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specify in the order a period that the court
considers adequate to allow the person se~k

ing an order to obtain an order from the
state having jurisdiction under ORS 109.741
to 109.747. The order issued in this state remains- irr effect until· an- order is- · obtained
from the other state within the period specified or the period expires.
(4) A court of this state that has been
asked to make a child custody determination
under this section, upon being informed that
a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination
has been made by, a court of a state having
jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.747,
shalt immediately communicate with the
other court. A court of this state that is exercising jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to
109.747, upon being informed that a child
custody proceeding has been commenced in,
or a child custody determination has been
made by, a court of another state under a
statute.. similar to this -section, shall imme- ·
diately communicate with the court of that
state to rewlve the emergency, protect the
safety of the parties and the child and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.. £1999 c.~ §16J.
Note: See note under 109.701.

N&tiee-; ~- to be·
heard; joinder. (1) Before a child custody
determination is made under ORS 109.701 to
109.834, notice and an opportunity to be
heard in accordance with the standards of
ORS 1()9;724 must be given to all persons·
entitled to notice under the law of this state
as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously
terminated- and- any person having physical
custody of the child.
(2} ORS 169:70-l to·l00;-834 do-not govern
the enforceability of a child custody determination made without notice or an. apportu-.
nity to be heard.
(3) The obligation to join a party and the
right to intervene as a party in a child cus·
tody proceeding under ORS 109.701 to
109:8-34 are governed- by the law of this state
as in child custody proceedings between residents of this. state.. [1..999. c.649 U7J
109.'154

Note: See note under 109.701.

109-.'15-7 Simulbmeous proeeedings. (1)
Except as otherwise provided in ORS 109.751,
a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.771 if, at

the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning-the custody
of the child has been commenced in a court
of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity Y.ith ORS 109.701 to
Title

n

109.761

109.834, unless the proceeding has been termi-nated or is stayed by the court of the
other state because a court of this state is a
more convenient forum u,nder ORS 109.761.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in ORS
109.751, a court of this state, before hearing
a child custody proceeding, shall examine the
court documents and other information supplied by the parties under ORS 109.767. If the
court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in
another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance \\'11th ORS 109.701 to
109.834, the court of this state shall stay its
prOceeding and communicate with the court
of the other state. If the court of the state
having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with ORS 109.701 to 109.834 does not
determine that the court of this state is a
more appropriate forum, the court of this
state shall dismiss the J)roceeding.
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child
custody determination, .a court of this state
shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has been commenced
in another state. If a proceeding to enforce
a child custody determination has been commenced in another state, the court may:
(a) Stay the proceeding for modification
pending the entry of an order of a court of
the other state enforcing, staying, denying or
dismissing the proceeding for enforcement;
(b) Enjoin the parties from continuing
with the proceeding for enforcement; or
(c) Proceed with the modification under
conditions it considers appropriate. [1999 c.649

§18]

Note: See note under 109 701.
Hlt.780· [1973 e.375 §6; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55)

109.761 Inconvenient forum. (1) A court
()f this state that· has j~sdiction under ORS
109.701 to 109.834 to make a child custody
de~rmination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if the court determines
that it is an inconvenient forum under the
circumstances and that a court of another
state is a more appropriate forum. The issue
of inconvenient forum may be raised upon
the motion of a party, the court's own motion or the request of another court.
(2) Before determining whether a court
of this state is an inconvenient forum, the
cow:t shaH consider whqther it is appropriate
for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall
allow the parties to submit information and
shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(a) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future
and which state could. pest protect the parties and the child;
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(b) The length of time the child has resided outside this state;
(c) The distance between the court in
this state and the court in the state that
would assume jurisdiction;
(d) The relative financial circumstances
of the parties;
(e) Any agreement of the parties as to
which state should assume jurisdiction;
(f) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;
(g) The ability of the court of each state
to .. d.ecide. tha issue expeditiously .. and the
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(h) The familiarity of the court of each
state with the facts and issues in the pending
litigation;
(3) If a court of this state determines that
it is an inoonvenient forum and that a court
of another state is a more appropriate forum,
it shall stay the proceedings upon condition
that a child custody proceeding be promptly
commenced in another designated state and
may im.pose any other condition . the court
considers just and proper.
(4) A court of this. state. may decline to
exercise its jurisdiction under ORS 109.701
to 109.834 if a child custody determination is
inci den tat tu an ~u;tion for ·divorce or another
proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction
over the divorce or other proceeding. [1999
c.649 §191
Note: See note Wlder 109.701.

109.764 Jurisdiction declined by reason
of conduct. (1) Except as otherwise provided
in ORS 1~'751· or· 419B.l00, if a court of thisstate has jurisdiction under ORS 109.701 to
109.834 because a person seeking to invoke
its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable
conduct to so invoke the jurisdiction, the
ll&Urt ·shall deelin~ ·t(t exercise its jurisdiction·
unless:
(a) The. parents. and .all persons.at:ting &&·
parents have acquiesced in the exercise of
jurisdiction;
(b) A court of the state otherwise having
jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.747
determines· that this- state· is- a nrore appropriate forum under ORS 109.761; or
(c)· N(t eooft· of any other· state· wouldhave jurisdiction under the criteria specified
in ORS 109.741 to 109.747.
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction under subsection (1) of
this section, it may fashion an appropriate
remedy to ensure the safety of the child and
prevent a repetition .of. the. unjustifiable conduct, including staying the proceeding until

Title 11

a child custody proceeding is commenced in
a court having jurisdiction under ORS
109.741 to 109.747.
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays
a proceeding because it declines to exerci~e
its jurisdiction under subsection (1) of this
section, it shall assess against the party
seeking to invoke its jurisdiction necessary
and reasonable expenses including costs,
communication expense~, attorney fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses,
travel expenses and child care expenses dur·
ing the course of the proceeding unless the
party from whom necessary and reasonable
expenses are sought establishes that the assessment would he clearly inappropriate.
The court may not assess fees, costs or expenses against this state unless authorized
by law other than ORS 109.701 to 109.834.
[1999 c.649 §20]
Note: See note under 109.701.

109.767 Information to be submitted
to court. (1) In a child custody proceeding,
each party, in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit, shall give information, if
reasonabl_r ascertainable, under oath as to
the child s present address or whereabouts,
the places where the child has lived during
the last five years and the names and present
addresses .(}[ th& per50Ils with whom the chlld
has lived during that period. The pleading or
affidavit must state whether the party:
(a) Has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any other
proceeding concerning- the custody of or parenting time or visitation with the child and,
if so, identify the court. the case number and
the date of the child custody determination,
if any;
(b) Knows of any proceeding that could
affect the current proceeding, including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings
relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights and
adoptions and, if so, identify the court, the
case number and the nature of the proceed·
ing; and
(c) Knows the names and addresses of
any person not a party t,o the proceeding who
has physical custody of the child or claims
rights of legal custody or physical custody of,
or parenting time or visitation with, the
child and, if so, the names and addresses of
those persons.
(2) If the information required by subsection (1) of this section is not furnished, the
court, upon motion of a party or its own
motion, may stay the proceeding until the
information is furnished.
(3) If the declaration as to any of the
ite.ms described in su~ction (1) of this section is in the affirmative, the declarant shall
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give additional information under oath as required by the court. The court may examine
the parties under oath as to details of the
information furnished and other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
(4) Each party has a continuing duty to
inform the court of any proceeding in this or
any other state that could affect the current
proceeding.
(5) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a
pleading under oath that the health, safety
or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of identifying information, the information must be sealed and may
not be disclosed to the other party or the
public unless the court orders the disclosure
to be made after a hearing in which the

(Enforcement)
109.774 Definitions for ORS 109.774 to
109.827. As used in ORS 109.774 to 109.827:
(1) "Petitioner" means a person who
seeks enforcement of an order for return of
a child under the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction or enforcement of a child custody
determination.
(2) "Respondent" means a person against
whom a proceeding has been commenced for
enforcement of an order for return of a child
under the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction or
enforcement of a child custody determination. [1999 c.649 §23!

court takes into consideration the health,

109.777 Enforcement under Hague
Convention. Under ORS 109.774 to 109.827,
a court of this state may also enforce an or·
der for the return of the child made under
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction as if the
order were a child custody determination.

safety or liberty of the party or child and
determines that the disclosure is in the interest of justice. Costs incurred by the court
when. special n(}l;ice procedures are made
necessary by the nondisclosure of identifying
information shall be paid by the parties as
deemed appropriate by the court. [1999 c.649
§21]
N&&e: See not& Wlde£.1Q9.70.l.

109.770 [1973 c.375 §7; 1981 c.897 §34; repealed by
1999 c.649 §55 J

109.771 Appearance of parties and
child. (1) In a child custody proceeding in
this state, the court may order a party to the
proceeding who is in this state to appear before the court in person with or without the
child. The court may order any person who
is in this state and 'vho has physical custody
or control of the child to appear in person
with the child.
(2) If a party to a child custody proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is
outside this state, the court may order that
a notice given under ORS 109.724 include a
statement directing the party to appear in
person with or without the child and informing the party that failure to appear may result in a decision adverse to the party.
(3) The court may enter any orders necessary- to ensure· the- safety ofthe ·child and
of any person ordered to appear under this
section.
(4) If a party to a child custody proceeding who is outside this state is directed to
appear under subsection (2) of this section
or desires to appear personally before the
court with or without the child, the court
may require another party to pay reasonable
and_ necessary. tra..:el and other. e.x.penses of
the party and the child so appearing. [1999
c.649 §22]
Note: See note under 109.701.

Tttle H

Note: See note under 109.701.

[1999 c.649 §241
Note: See note under 109.701.
lf8780 [1973 t-37:> §6; :W81 c.6S7 §35; repealed by
1999 c.649 §55]·

109.781 Duty to enforce. (1) A court of
this state shall recognize and enforce a child
custody determination of a court of another
state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction
in substantial conformity with ORS 109.701
to 109.834 or the ~mination was made
under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of ORS 109.701 to
109.834 and the determination has not been
modified in accordance 'with ORS 109.701 to
109.834.
(2) A court of this state may utilize any
remedy available under other law of this
state to enforce a child custody determination made by a court· of another state. The
remedies provided in ORS 109.774 to 109.827
are cumulative and do- not affect the availability of other remedies to enforce a child
custody determination. (1999 c.649 §25]
Note: See note under 109.701.

109.784 Temporary order for parenting

time or visitation. In a child custody enforcement proceeding authorized by law:
(1) A court of this state that does not
have jurisdiction to nmdify a child custody
determination may issue a temporary order
enforcing:
·
·
(a) A parenting time or visitation schedule made by a court of another state; or
(b) The visitatidn or parenting time provisions of a child custody determination of
another state that permit visitation or par-
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(5) A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order must request a
hearing within 21 days after service of the
notice. At that hearing, the court shall con·
firm the registered order unless the person
contesting registration e_stablishes that:
(n) The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.771;
(b) The child custody determination
sought to be registered has been vacated,
stayed or modified by a court having jurisNet.:- SH lll:lte under 109.701.
diction to do so under ORS 109.741 to
109.787 Registration of child custody 109.771; or
detennination; notice; hearing. (1) A child
(c) The person contesting registration
custody determination issued by a court of was entitled to notice, but notice was not
another state may be registered in this state, given in accordance with the standards of
with or without a· simtrltaneous request for ORS 109.724, in the proceedings before the
enforcement, by sending to any circuit court court that issued the order for which regis·
in.t.ha state:
tration is sought.
(a) A letter or .other document requesting
(6) If a timely request for a hearing to
registration;
contest the validity of the registration is not
(b) Two copies, including one certified made, the registration is confirmed as . a
copy, of the determination sought to be reg- matter of law and the person requesting registered .. and- a- statement undeP penalty of istration and all persons served must be noperjury that to the best of the knowledge and tified of the confirmation.
belief of the ~rson seeking registration the
{7) Confirmation of a registered order,
order has not been modified; ana
whether by operation of law or after notice
{c) Except as otherwise provided in ORS and hearing, precludes further contest of the
109:767; tlie name and address of the person order with respect to any matter that could
seeking registration and any parent or per- have been asserted at the time of registrason acting as.. a.~.whn ~been awarded tion. [1999 c.649 §271
custody, parenting time or visitation in the
Note: See note under 109.701.
child custody determination sought to be
109.1!10 [1973 c.375 §9; 1997 c.707 §24; repealed by
registered.
1999 c.649 §551
(2) On receipt of the documents required
109.791 Enforcement of reJistered deby_ mbsecticn- (1) of this· section, the regis- termination.
(1} A court of thiS state may
tering court shall cause the determination to grant any relief normally available under- the
be filed as a foreign judgment, together with law of this state to enforce a registered child
one copy of any accompanying documents custody determination made by a court of
and information, regardless of their form.
another state.
(3} The person seeking registration of a
(2) A court of this state shaH recognize
child custody determination shal1 serve notire upon the persons named · undct subsec- and enforce, but may not modify, except in
tion (lXc) of this section notifying them of accordance with ORS 109.741 to 109.771, a
the opportunity. to. contest. the. registration in registered child custody determination of a
court of another state; (1999 c.649 §281
accordance with this section.
Note; See note under 109.701.
(4) The notice required by subsection (3)
of this section must state that:
109.'194 "Simultaneous proceedings. If a
(a) A registered determination is en- proceeding for enforcement under ORS
lorceabre as of the date of the registration· in 109.774 to 109.827 is .commenced in a court
the same manner as a detennination issued of this state and the ootirt determines that a
proceeding to modify the determination is
by a court ofthis state;
pending in a court of another state having
(b) A hearing to contest the validity of jurisdiction to modify the determination unthe registered determination must be re· der ORS 109.741 to 1Q9.771, the enforcing
quested within 21 days after service of no- court shall immediately communicate with
tice; and
the modifying court. The proceeding for en(c) Failure to contest the registration forcement continues unless the enforcing
will result in confirmation of the child eus- court, after consultation with the modifying
tedy- determination and preclude further. con- court, stays or dismisses the proceeding. [1999
,
test of that detennination with respect to c.649 §29l
Note: See note under 109.701.
any_ matter that could have been asserted.
enting time but do not provide for a specific
visitation or parenting time schedule.
(2) If a court of this state makes an order
under subsection (l)(b) of this section, the
court shall specify in the order a period that
it considers adequate to allow the petitioner
to obtain an order from a court having iu·
risdiction under the criteria specified in ORS
109.741 to 109.771. The order remains in effect until an order is obtained ·from the other
court or the period expires. [1999 c.649 ~l
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109.797 Expedited enforcement of child
custody determination. (1) A petition under ORS 109.774 to 109.827 must be verified.
Certified copies of all orders sought to be
enforced and of any order confirming registration must be attached to the petition. A
copy of a certified copy of an order may be
attached instead of the original.
(2) A petition for enforcement of a child
custody determination must state:
(a) Whether the court that issued the determination identified the jurisdictional basis
it relied upon in exercising jurisdiction and,
if so, what the basis was;
(b) Whether the deternnnation for which
enforcement is sought has been vacated,
stayed or modified by a court whose decision
must be enforced under ORS 109.701 to
109.834 and, if so, must identify the court,
the ca&-e number and the nature -of the proceeding;
(e) Whether any- prooeeding has been
commenced that could affect the current
proceeding, including proceedings relating to
domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights and adoptions and,
if SG,- must identify. the court, the case number and the nature of the proceeding;
(d) The present physical address of the
child and the respondent, if known;
(e) Whether relief in addition to the immediate physical custody of the child and attorney fees is sought, including a request for
assistance from law enforcement officials
and, if so, the relief sought; and
(f) If the clllld eustody determination has
been registered and confirmed under ORS
109.787, the date and place of registration.
(3) Upon the flling of a petition, the
court shall issue an order directing the respondent to appear in person with or without
the child at a hearing and may enter any
order necessary to ensure the safety of the
parties and the child. If the court issues an
order, the order shall be served in the manner the court determines · to be appropriate
under the circumstances of the case and may
include service by the sheriff. The person requesting the order shall pay the costs of service. The court shall hold the hearing as
soon- as reasonably possib-le· and- shall expedite the hearing if it finds an emergency is
present.
(4) An order issued under subsection (3)
of this section must state the time and place
of the hearing and advise the respondent that
at the hearing the court will order that the
petitioner may take- immediate physical custody of the child and will order the payment
of fees, costs and expenses under ORS
109.811, and may schedule a hearing to de-
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109.804

termine whether further relief is appropriate,
unless the respondent .. appears and establishes that:
(a) The child custody determination has
not been registered and confirmed under
ORS 109.787 and that:
(A) The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.771;
(B) The child custody determination for
which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed or modified by a court having
jurisdiction to do so under ORS 109.741 to
109.771; or
(C) 'I'he respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance
with the standards of ORS 109.724, in the
proceedings before the court that issued the
order for which enforcement is sought; or
(b) The child custody determination for
which enforcement is sought was registered
and confirmed under ORS 109.787, hut has
been vacated, stayed or modified by a court
of a state having jurisdiction to do so under
ORS 109.741 to 109.771. [t999 c.649 §30l
Note: See note. under 109.701.
109.800 [1973 c.375 §10; 1997 c.707 §25; repealed by

1999 c.649 §55I

109.801 Service of petition and order.
Except as otherwise provided in ORS 109.807,
the petition and order for enforcement of a
child custody determination must be served
by the petitioner, by any method authorized
for service of process within this state, upon
the respondent and any person who has
physical custody of the child. [1999 c:.649 §311
No~e:

See note under 109.701.

109.804 Immediate physical custody of
child allowed; exceptions; spousal privi-

lege not allowed in certain proceedings.
(1) Unless the court issues a temporary
emergency order under ORS 109.751, upon a
finding that a petitioner is entitled to immediate physical custody of the child under the
controlling child custoqy determination, the
court shall order that the petitioner may
take immediate physical custody of the child
unless the respondent establishes that:
(a) The child custody determination has
not been registered and confirmed under
ORS 109.787 and that:
<Al The issuing court did not have jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.771;
(B) The child custody determination for
which enforcement is sought has been va·
cated, stayed or modified by n court of a
state having jurisdiction to do so under ORS
109.741 to 109.771; or
(C) The respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance
with the standards of ORS 109.724, in the
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proceedings before the court that issued the
order. for .which enforcement is sought; or
(b) The child custody detennination for
which enforcement is sought was registered
and confinned under ORS 109.787, but has
been vacated, stayed or modified by a court
of a- sta-re- having jurisdiction to do so under

ORS 109.741 to 109.771.
(2). The court shall award the fees, costsand expenses authorized under ORS 109.811,
may grant additional relief, including a request for the assistance of law enforcement
officials, and may set further hearings, if
necessary,. to determine whether additional
relief is appropriate.
(3) A privilege ag~nst disclosure of communications between spouses and a defense
of immunity based on the relationship of
husba:ml- and wife· or parent and ·child may
not be invoked .in a proceeding under ORS
109.774 to 109.827. [1999 1:.649 §32]
Note: See note under 109.701.

it may authorize law enforcement officers to
enter private propt!rtY to take physical custody of the child. If required by exigent circumstances of the case, the court may
authorize law enforcement officers to make
a forcible entry at any hour.
(6) The court may impose conditions
upon placement of a child to ensure the appearance of the child and the child's custodian. {1999 e649 §331
Note: See note under 109.70L
109.810 11973 c.375 §11; repealed by 1999 c.649 §551

109.811 Costs, fees and expenses. (1)
The court shall award the prevailing party,
including a state, necessary and reasonable
expenses incurred by or on behalf Qf the
party, including costs, communication expenses, attorney fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses and
child care expenses during the course of the
proceedings, unless the party from whom fees
or expenses are sought, establishes that the
award would be clearly inappropriate. An
award may be inappropriate if the award
would cause the parent or child to seek public assistance.
(2) The court may not assess fees, costs
or expenses against a state unless authorized
by law other than ORS 109.701 to 109.834.

109.807 Warrant to take phpical custody of child. (1) Upon the filing of a petition seeking enforcement of a child custody
determination, the- petitioner· may ·file ·a venfied application for the issuance of a warrant
to take physical custody of the child if the
chffiJ is immediatefy likely to suffer serious
physical harm or be removed from this state. (1999 !!.649 §34}
Nete: See note under 109.701.
(2) If tire court, upon- the· testimony of the
petitioner or other witness, is satisfied that
109.814 Recoguition and enforcement.
there is probable cause to believe that the A court of this state s~ll a:ccord full faith
child is imminently likely to suffer serious and credit to an order issued by another
physical hann or he removed from this state, state and consistent with ORS 109.701 to
it may issue· a ·warnmt·tu ·take physical cus- 109.834 that enforces a child custody detertody of the child. The petition must be heard mination by a court of another state unless
on the next j1,1dicial day after the warrant is the order has been vaatted, stayed or modiexecuted unless that date is impossible. In fied by a court having jurisdiction to do so
that event, the court shall hold the hearing under ORS 109.741 to 109.771. ll999 c.649 §35]
ctn · the fll'St judicial day possible: The· ap~li
Note: See note under 109.701.
cation for the warrant must include the
109.817 Appeals. An appeal may be
statements required by ORS 109.797 (2).
taken
from a final order in a proceeding un(3) A warrant to take physical custody
der ORS 109.774 to 109.827 in accordance
of a child must:
with ORS chapter 19. Unless the court en(a) Recite the facts upon which a con- ters a temporary emergency order under ORS
clusion of imminent serious physical harm or 109.751, the enforcing court may not stay an
removal from the jurisdiction is based;
. order enforcing a child custody determi(b) Direct law enforcement officers to nation pending appeal. [1999 c.649 §361
take physical custody of. the. child . imme- .
Note: See not!! W1der 109.701.
diately; and
109.820 [1973 c.375 §12; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55]
(c) Provide for the placement of the child
109.821 Role of district attorney. {1) In
pending final relief.
a case arising under ORS 109.701 to 109.834
(4) The respondent must be served with or involving the Hague Convention on the
the petition, warrant and order immediately Civil Aspects of International Child
after the child is taken into physkal custody. Abduction, the district attorney may take
(5} A warrant to take physical custody any lawful action, including resort to a proof a child is enforceable throughout this ceeding under ORS 109.774 to 109.827 or any
state. If the court fmds on the basis of the other available civil proceeding, to locate a
testimony of the petitioner or other witness child, obtain the return of a child or enforce
that a less intrus1ve remedy is not effective, a child custody determination if there is:
Title 11
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(a) An existing child custody determination;
(b) A request to do so from a court in a
pending child custody proceeding;
(c) A reasonable belief that a criminal
statute· has been violated; or
(d) A reasonable belief that the child has
been wrongfully removed or retained in violation of the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction.
(2) A district attorney acting under this
section acts on behalf of the state to protect
the state•s interest in the enforcement of
ORS 109.701 to 109.834 and may not represent any party. [1999 c.649 §371
Note: See note under 109.701.

109.824 Role of .law enforcement offi·
cer. At the request of a district attorney
acting under ORS 109.821, a law enforcement
officer may take any lawful action reasonably nece~ary to locate a child or a party
and assist a district attorney with responsibilities under ORS 109.821. [1999 c.649 §38J
Note: See note under 109.701.

109.827 Costs and expenses of district
attorney and law enforcement officers. If
the respondent is not the prevailing party,
the court may assess against the respondent
all direct expenses and costs incurred by the
district attorney and law enforcement officers under ORS 109.821 or 109.824. [1999 c.649
§39}

See note under 109.701.
109.83& £1M3 e.375 l13; repealed by 1999 c.64& i55J

Note:

(Miscellaneous Prcvlisions)
109.831 Application and construction.
In.. applying and construing ORS 109.701 to
109.834, consideration must be given to the
need to promote uniformity of the law with
respect to its- subject- mattPr ·among- states
that enact it. [1999 e.649 §4DJ

Title 11

109.990

Note: See note under 109.701.

109.834 Severability clause. H any provision of ORS 109.701 to 109.834 or its application to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the invalidity does not affect other
provisions or applications of ORS 109.701 to
109.834 that can be given effect without the
invalid provision or application, and to this
end the provisions of ORS 109.701 to 109.834
are severable. (1999 e.649 §411
Note: See note Wlder 109.701.
Note: Section 42, chapter 649. Oreeon Laws 1999,
provides:
s.e. 42. A motion or other request for relief made
in a child custody proceeding or to enforce a child
custody determination that was commenced before the
etreWve date of this 1999 Act [October 23, 1999] is governed by the law in effect at the time the motion or
other request was made. [1999 c.649 §42]
109.840 [1973 c.375 §14; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55]
109.850 [1973 c.375 §15; i981 c.897 §36; repealed by
1999 c.649 f.'i.'i]
109.860 [1973 c.375 §16; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55]
109.870 [1973 c.375 §17; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55)
109.880 L1973 e.375 §18; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55]
109.880 [1973 c.375 §19; iepeaied. by 1999 c.649 §55]
109.900 [1973 c.375 §20; repealed by 1999 c.649 ~]
109.910 [1973 c.3i5 §21; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55]
lOU'JO [1973 c.375 §22; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55)
109SJO [1973 c.3i5 §24; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55]

PENALTY.
109.990 Penalty. (1) A person who violates ORS 109.311 (3) or who submits a false
statement under ORS 109.311 (1) commits a

Class C felony.
(2) A person \Vho violates any provision
of ORS 109.311 (4) or 109.502 to 109.507 or
any rule adopted pursuant to ORS 109.506
commits a Class A misdemeanor. [1985 e.403 §2
(4); 1993 c.717 §5; subsection (3) of 1993 Edition enacted
as 1993 c.410 §9; 1995 c.79 §44; 1995 c.730 §4]
.Note: See note Wider 109.425.
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Utah Code § 78-4Sc-3

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state
( 1) A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a
child custody determination by initial or modification decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the
following paragraphs are met:
(a) this state:
(i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding; or
(ii) had been the child's home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this state because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for
other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this state;
(b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because:

(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with
this state; and
(ii) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships;
(c) the child is physically present in this state or this state is the most recent domicile of the mother
prior to the birth of the child, and:
(i) the child has been abandoned; or
(ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened
with mistreatment or abuse or is o1herwise neglected or dependent; or
(d)(i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in
accordance wi1h Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c), or ano1her state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child; and
(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(2) Except under Subsections ( 1)(c) and (d), physical presence in this state of the child, or of the child
and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a
child custody determination.
Copyright (c) West Group 1997 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to detennine his
custody.
*24561
As last amended by Chapter 143, Laws of Utah 1990.
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Utah Code § 78-45c-4

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
Cu"ent through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 78-45c-4. Persons to be notified and heard
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to
the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, and any person who
has physical custody of the child. If any of these persons is outside this state, notice and opportunity to be
heard shall be given pursuant to section 78-45c-5.
As enacted by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah 1980.

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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Utah Code § 78-45c-5

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 78-45c-5. Service of notice outside state-Proof of service--Submission to jurisdiction
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person outside this state shall be given in a
manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and may be made in any of the following ways:
(a) By personal delivery outside this state in the manner prescribed for service of process within this
state;
(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is made for service of process
in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction;

(c) By any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting a receipt; or
(d) As directed by the court (including publication, if other means of notification are ineffective).
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, delivered, or last published at least 10 days
before any hearing in this state.
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the individual who made the service,
or in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the
law of the place in which the service is made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by
the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee.
(4) Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
As enacted by Chapter 41. Laws of Utah 1980.
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Utah Code § 78-45c-6

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
Cu"ent through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 78-45c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere--Jurisdiction not exercised--Inquiry to other state-Information exchange--Stay of proceeding on notice of another proceeding
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this act if at the time of f:tling the
petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of another state
exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this act, unless the proceeding is stayed by the
court of the other state because this state is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons.
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court shall examine the pleadings and other
information supplied by the parties under section 78-45c-10 and shall consult the child custody registry
established under section 78-45c-16 concerning the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child in
other states. If the court has reason to believe that proceedings may be pending in another state it shall
direct an inquiry to the state court administrator or other appropriate official of the other state.
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding concerning the
custody of the child was pending in another state before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the
proceeding and communicate with the court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the
issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in accordance
with sections 78-45c-19 through 78-45c-22. If a court of this state has made a custody decree before
being informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another state it shall immediately inform that court
of the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding was commenced in another state after it assumed
jurisdiction it shall likewise inform the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the more
appropriate forum.
As enacted by Chapter 41, Laws ofUtah 1980.
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Utah Code § 78-45c-7

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient forum-Factors in determination-Communication with other court--Awarding costs
( 1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an initial or modification decree may decline
to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it fmds that it is an inconvenient forum to

make a custody determination under the circmnstances of the case and that a court of another state is a
more appropriate forum.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a
party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the
child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into account the following
factors, among others:
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(b) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the child and one or
more of the contestants;

(c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships is more readily available in another state;
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate; and
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any of the purposes stated in
section 78-45c-1.
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court may communicate with a
court of another state and exchange information pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court
with a view to assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court and that a forum
will be available to the parties.
(5) If the court fmds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the proceedings upon condition that a
custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another named state or upon any other conditions which
may be just and proper, including the condition that a moving party stipulate his consent and submission
to the jurisdiction of the other forum.
Copyright (c) West Group 1997
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*24566 (6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a custody determination
is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or
other proceeding.

(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may require the party who
commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the proceedings in this state, necessary
travel and other expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment
is to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party.
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the court shall inform the court found to
be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the court which would have jurisdiction in the other state
is not certainly known, shall transmit the information to the court administrator or other appropriate
official for forwarding to the appropriate court.
(9) Any communication received from another state informing this state of a finding of inconvenient
forum because a court of this state is the more appropriate forum shall be filed in the custody registry of
the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this state shall inform the original court of
this fact.
As enacted by Chapter 41, Laws ofUtah 1980.
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Utah Code§ 78-45c-8

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHUD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing jurisdiction--Notice to another
jurisdiction-Ordering petitioner to appear in other court or to return child--Awarding costs
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has
engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction for purposes of
adjudication of custody if this is just and proper under the circumstances.

(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a
custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody has
improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has
improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If the
petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state the court may decline to
exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdiction upon petition for an initial custody decree pursuant
to Subsection ( 1), the court shall notify the parent or other appropriate person and the prosecuting attorney
of the appropriate jurisdiction in the other state. If a request to that effect is received from the other state,
the court shall order the petitioner to appear with the child in a custody proceeding instituted in the other
state in accordance with Section 78-45c-20. If no such request is made within a reasonable time after such
notification, the court may entertain a petition to determine custody by the petitioner if it has jurisdiction
pursuantto Section 78-45c-3.
(4) Where the court refuses to assume jurisdiction to modify the custody decree of another state
pursuant to Subsection (2) or pursuant to Section 78-45c-14, the court shall notify the person who has
legal custody under the decree of the other state and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate
jurisdiction in the other state and may order the petitioner to return the child to the person who has legal
custody. If it appears that the order will be ineffective and the legal custodian is ready to receive the child
within a period of a few days, the court may place the child in a foster care home for such period, pending
return of the child to the legal custodian. At the same time, the court shall advise the petitioner that any
petition for modification of custody must be directed to the appropriate court of the other state which has
continuing jurisdiction, or, in the event that that court declines jurisdiction, to a court in a state which has
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-4Sc-3.
*24568 (5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section may charge the
petitioner with necessary travel and other expenses, including attorney's fees and the cost of returning the
child to another state.
Added by lAws 1980, c. 41. Amended by lAws 1995, c. 20, § 175, eff. May 1, 1995.
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Utah Code§ 78-45c-12

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM ClllLD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
Cu"ent through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 78-45c-12. Parties bound by custody decree--Conclusive unless modified
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which had jurisdiction under section 78-45c-3, binds
all parties who have been served in this state or notified in accordance with section 78-45c-5 or who have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to
these parties the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as to the custody
determination made unless and until that determination is modified pursuant to law, including the
provisions of this act.
As enacted by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah 1980.
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CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR LINCOLN COUNTY, 17TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
P.O. Box 100
Newport, Oregon 97365
Telephone (541) 265-4236

I, THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, OF THE STATE OF OREGON FOR
LINCOLN COUNTY, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING COPY OF CASE
FILE 001309. HAS BEEN COMPARED BY ME WITH THE ORIGINAL AND THAT IT IS A
CORRECT TRANSCRIPT THEREFROM, AND OF THE WHOLE OF SUCH ORIGINAL AS
THE SAME APPEARS ON FILE OR OF RECORD IN MY OFFICE AND IN MY CUSTODY.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HAND AND AFFIXED THE
SEAL OF SAID COURT THIS 25TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2000.

BY\i.~
CIRCUIT COURT

RK.
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3
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4

COURT

2 o 2000

5

6
7

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

8

FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN

9

Department of Domestic Relations

lO

11

RONALD THURSTON,

12

Petitioner,

13

and

14

JENNIFER THURSTON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Respondent.

15

Case No:t:Jtf!,<:J/Jt?
PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION
OF MARRIAGE

16

Petitioner alleges:

17

l.

18

The Petitioner and Respondent were married in Sanpete County, Utah on January 28,

19
20

1983 and have ever since been husband and wife.

2.

21

Irreconcilable differences between the parties have caused the irremediable breakdown

22
23

of their marriage.

24

///

25

Ill

26

Ill

27

28
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PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

MARK G. OBERT
Attorney at Law
1740 Liberty St. SE
Salem, OR 97302
(503) 375-6278

1

3.

2

There are two other domestic relations suits involving dependents of this marriage is

3

pending in Lincoln County Courts. They are restraining order cases titled Jennifer Thurston vs

4

Ronald Thurston, Lincoln County Case Nq. 99-1560 and Ronald Thurston vs. Jennifer Thurston,

5

Lincoln County Case No. 99-1558. Both of these cases were consolidated by the court in an Order

6

dated November 12, 1999 which also gave custody of the parties minor children to the Petitioner

7

herein. A dissolution and child custody proceeding was filed in Sanpete County, Utah by the

8

Respondent. The Utah court dismissed the action on the basis that Oregon was the proper forum for

9

the determination of issues regarding the minor children. Finally there is a criminal case pending in

10

which the Respondent has been indicted for taking the children from the State of Oregon against the

11

Order of the court in the above listed Oregon cases.

4.

12
13
14

For more thansix(6) months prior to the filing ofthe Petition herein, Petitioner is now
and has been a continuous resident of the State of Oregon.

5.

15
16

The children bornofthismarriageare: MELISSA LEE THU~STON, born August

17

6, 1983, TRISCHA LEIGHANNE THURSTON, born July 16, 1985, and CHRISTOPHER

18

LYNDON THURSTON, born December 5, 1989. Respondent is not now pregnant.
The addresses where the children have lived and the persons lived with during

19

(a)

20

the last two years are as follows:

21

1)

Salem, Oregon, with Petitioner and Respondent from 1993 to 1998;

22

2)

lO I Salishshan Dr., Glenden Beach, Oregon with Petitioner and
Respondent from 1998 through 1999;

23
3)

24

Lincoln County Oregon has jurisdiction of these children based upon the Court's

25
26

Somewhere in Utah with Respondent from 1999 to present.

rulings in Lincoln County Case No. 99-1558 and 99-1560.

27
28
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MARK G. OBERT
Attorney at Law
1740 Liberty St. SE
Salem. OR 97302

(b)

Petitioner has participated as a party in the cases listed in 3 above regarding

2

ligation concerning the custody of the minor child in this or any other state. Petitioner knows of no

3

person not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of the minor child or claims to have

4

custody or visitation rights with respect to ~he minor child.

6.

5
6

The other information required by ORS 107.085(3) is:

7

(a)

8

his date ofbirth is January 25, 1965; he is 34 years old; this is the first marriage of the

9

Petitioner.

Petitioner's residence or legal address is 5015 Dune Ct., Lincoln City, Oregon;

Respondent's residence or legal address is currently unknown, however it is

10

(b)

II

thought she might be with her parents at 251 S. Main, Sterling Utah.; her age is 34

12

years old; her date of birth is August 9, 1966; her social security number is unknown;

13

this is the first marriage of the Respondent. Respondent's maiden n3me is Gibb.

7.

14
15

Petitioner is a fit and proper persons and should be awarded the care, custody and

16

control ofthe parties minor children. Respondent should be granted limited supervised visitation

17

with the minor children due to the risk of her leaving the state with the children and secrete the

18

children from the Petitioner.

19

8.

20

Respondent should be required to pay and Petitioner should have judgment against

21

Respondent for the support of the parties minor children, pursuant to the State of Oregon Child

22

Support Guidelines. Support should commence on the first day of the month following entry of the

23

Judgment ofDissolution and continue on the same day ofeach month thereafter until the minor child

24

cease to qualify as a "child attending school" as defined in ORS 107,198(4) or attains the age of18

25

years, whichever shall last occur. Support should be recalculated at that time in accordance with

26

then-existing statutory child support guidelines

27
28
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NOTICE
2

Oregon Law now requires that payment ofchild support under new or modified orders

3

be by income withholding, even ifno arrearage is owed. An exception to withholding may be granted

4

pursuant to ORS 25.317 if good cause is found to exist or the parties agree in writing to another

5

arrangement.

(a)

6

Payments should be made through the Department of Human Resources, PO

7

Box 14506, Salem, Oregon, 97309. The Department of Human Resources

8

should provide collection, accounting, distribution and enforcement services

9

in accordance with the provisions ofORS 25.320;
(b)

10

The party obligated to pay support should pay any service charges imposed
by the collecting agency.

11

9.

12

13

As additional support, Respondent should be required to:

14

(a)

Pay one-half of all of the children's reasonably incurred medical, opticaL
hospitaL dental and orthodontic expenses which are not covered by insurance.

15
b)

16

Maintain an insurance policy insuring his life in an ~ount not less than

17

$200,000.00, naming the minor child (or a trustee on their behalf), as

18

beneficiaries.

19

( 1)
The obligation to maintain insurance should continue so long as
Respondents are required to pay child support as decreed by the court or an
arrearage exists for accrued but unpaid support;

20

(2)
The following provisions relate to procedural aspects of the
requirement to maintain insurance:

21
22

A)

During the term of the obligation to maintain insurance
Respondents should furnish to Petitioners, upon request, a
copy of the policy or evidence the proper life insurance is in
force with the appropriate bef!e~ciary designation in effect.

B)

A constructive trust should be imposed over the proceeds of
any insurance owned by Respondents at the time of
Respondents' death if Respondents fail to maintain insurance
in said amount, or if said insurance is in force but another

23
24
25
26
27
28

Page 4-

PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

MARK G. OBERT
Attorney at law
1740 Liberty St. SE
Salem, OR 97302
(5031375~278

beneficiary is designated to receive said funds.
2
3
4

5
6

C)

Respondents are prohibited from borrowing any monies from
or against or in any way reducing the benefits of said policies.

D)

Respondents should provide a certified copy of this order to
the appropriate life insurance company in accordance with the
provisions ofORS 107.820(6), notify said company as to the
terms of this order regarding life insurance and instruct it to
update its records to guarantee compliance herewith.
Respondents should provide Petitioners proof of compliance
with this provision within 60 days of the date of this order.

7

8

10.

9

Each party should maintain the minor children of the parties on their medical, dental

10

and hospital insurance so long as said insurance is available through her place of employment at little

11

or no cost.

11.

12
13

The parties do not own real property.

14

12.

15

Petitioner and Respondent have previously divided their personal property and each

16

party should be awarded the property in their control as of the date of this petition free from any

17

claim of the other.

18

13.

19

Petitioner and Respondent should each be awarded the bank accounts, retirement

20

accounts and any other financial possessions in their name as of the date ofthis petition free from any

21

claim ofthe other.

22

14.

23

Respondent has incurred various doctor bills and she should be required to pay said

24

bills and hold Petitioner harmless therefrom . Each party should be awarded the remaining debts in

25

their name as of the date of this petition.

26

Ill

27
28
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1

15.

2

Respondent should be required to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees and costs incurred

3

herein ifthis matter is contested. If the matter is not contested, each party should pay their respective

4

attorney fees.
16.

5

Each of the parties should pay the debt incurred by that party since their separation

6

7

on or about June 1999.

8

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for a Judgment:

9

1.

Dissolving the marriage of the parties;

10

2.

Granting relief in conformance with the allegations of this petition; and,

II

3.

Granting other appropriate equitable relief as this court finds just and proper.

12

DATED this~ day of March, 2000.

13

s

I4

9?;£CfPR

G. OBERT, OSB NO. 96380
Attorney for Petitioner
Trial Attorney

15
16

17
18
19

STATEOFOREGON

)

20

Cowtty ofMarion

)

21

) ss.

I, RONALD THURSTON, Petitioner herein, underpenaltyofperjury, swear that to

~: =•o~ny,=.ormation and belief, all the~dissolution of

25
Ill
26

Ill

27
28
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CERTIFICATE OF RESIDENCY

2
3

ForthepurposeofORS 14.070 and UTCR8.010{1), I herebycertifythatl and/or the
Respondent currently reside in Lincoln County, where the foregoing Petition for Dissolution of
Marriage is being filed.

4

5

6
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1J,_ day of March 2000.

7
8

9
10

-

OFFICIAL SEAL
MARK G. OBERT
NOTARY PUBLIC - OREGON
COMMISSION NO. 057578
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES SEPT. 12, 2000

My Commission Expires

cut~/
I

D;:>

11

12
NOTICE TO PARTIES IN SUIT FOR MARRIAGE,
DISSOLUTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION

13
14
15
16

If you are a spouse who is covered as a dependent under a group health insurance
policy, Oregonlaw(ORS 743.850 to 743.890) allows you to maintain health insurance coverage after
divorce or legal separation, when you might otherwise lose that coverage. You may continue
coverage under the group policy or you may obtain coverage under an individual health insurance
policy. You may also maintain coverage for any dependent whose coverage otherwise would end
because of the dissolution or legal separation. The following is a summary of the applicable laws:

17

Ifyou are a divorced or legally se.parated spouse and you are 55 years of age
or older at the time ofthe dissolution or legal separation, you may continue coverage under the group
policy:
I.

18
19
20

a.
If you notify the group health insurance plan administrator in writing
of the legal separation or dissolution within 60 days of the legal separation or the entry of the
Judgment and Decree;

21
22

b.
If you elect to continue the group coverage and you make the electric
on a form provided by the plan administrator; and,

c.

23
24
25

If you pay the premium when due.

This provision applies only with respect to employers with 20 or more employees and
group health insurance plans with 20 or more certificate holders. ThiS provision does not apply to
policies issued before September 27, 1987, but does apply to policies issued or renewed on or after
September 27, 1987.

26

2.

If you are a divorced spouse who has not reached 55 years of age at the time

27
28
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2
3

of dissolution, you may continue coverage under the group policy upon dissolution of the marriage
ifyou request the insurer or the group policyholder in writing to continue coverage. You must make
the request not later than 10 days after the date that your coverage under the group policy as a
qualified family member would end, or I 0 days after the date on which the employer or policyholder
gives notice ofthe right to continue coverage, whichever date is later; however, in any case you may
not make the request later than the 31st day after your coverage as a qualified family member ends.

4

This provision:

5
6

7

a.
Applies with respect to employers who are not required under federal
law to make continuation of coverage benefits available.
b.
Applies with respect to employers with 20 or more employees and
group health insurance plans with 20 or more certificate holders.

8
9
10

11
12

13
14

c.

Does not apply to legally separated spouses.

3.
If you are a divorced or legally separated spouse, regardless of age, you may
obtain coverage under an individual health insurance policy by applying to the group insurer either
within 31 days following the date on which the coverage under the group policy ends because you
are no longer a qualified family member or at any time while coverage under the group policy is
continued as described in the paragraphs above.
This notice is intended to tell you that you may be able to continue your health
coverage after your divorce or separation and that your time for doing so is limited." However, this
notice is not a complete statement of all Oregon laws that may apply to you. For more information,
you should call your health insurer, the plan administrator for your insurance coverage, the employer
to whom your insurance is provided, or your attorney.

15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

26
27

28
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN
Department of Domestic Relations

RONALD THURSTON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
and
JENNIFER THURSTON,
Respondent.

STATEOFOREGON

Case No:

001309

PROOF OF SERVICE

)

) ss.
County of Marion

)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I made service of the foregoing Petition for Disoslution,
Motion for Temporary Relief and Show Cause, Order to Show Cause, Motion, Affidavit and Order
for Temporary Custody and Order Granting Temporary Custody to the within named Respondent
by delivering, or leaving a true copy of said documents, certified to be such by the attorney for the
Respondent as follows:
PERSONAL SERVICE

.15 \ S .

By delivering such true copy to the Respondent personally and in person at
Ov\ \3
' .S\-ex\ \
Utah, on
0 3
'2000, at

~I
m
q. ':lr o clock, ~.m.
,

PROOF OF SERVICE

'3'

mAy

MARK G. OBERT
Attorney at Law
1740 Liberty St. SE
Salem, OR 97302
(503) 375-6278

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
By delivering such true copy at Defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode,
to-wit:
, to
,
who is a person over the age of 14 years and a member of the household of the Respondent, on
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ' 2000, at
o'clock, _.m.
OFFICE SERVICE
By delivering such true copy of the documents to
, the
person who is apparently in charge of the office which Defendant maintains for the conduct ofhis/her
business at
on
, 2000, during normal
working hours, at to wit:
o'clock _.m.

DATED: _ _ __
Signature

I further certify that I am a competent person 18 years of age or older and a resident of the state of
service or the State of Oregon, and that I am not a party to nor an office, director or employee of,
nor attorney for any party, corporate or otherwise; that the person, firm or corporation served by me
is the identical person, firm or corporation named in he action.

Type or Print arne

2340 , 5til SJ-tYG ,'.:.cscf&e;

Address

2?.3Q1

PROOF OF SERVICE

Phone:37/-/L55

MARK G. OBERT
Attorney at Law
1740 Liberty St. SE
Salem, OR 97302

(503) 375-6278

JOURNAL ENTRY

DATE:

CASE CAPTION:
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B. STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

2

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 (c)

2,6

Utah Code Annotated§ 30-3-5 (c)

v

Appellant, Ted Jay Adamson,

Rule 24 of the

p~rsua~t

~ta~

Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this Appeal Brief.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code 'mnotat:eci §

-7 t;-2a-~ \L:) 1h1.

r1e o::::::-J.e::

appealed

al~

~art:1es.

f1nal order dlsposing of all claims of

fran

- -,

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

does not have jurisdiction and authority to modify the property
awara in the partles' Decree of Dlvorce?
Did the trial court commit an error of law in failing to
disti~

ish

t~a~

the benefits Pespondent lS currentl\· receivinc

than retirement benefits awarded in the decree?
S~ANDARD

OF APPELLATE REVIEW

Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law

conclusions for correctness and to determine whether there has

court"s legal cCJnclusior:s. Barber
248

Farmers Ins. Exc::,

"""'t:

(Utah Ct App. 1988); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah

1989)"

1

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

The determinative statutory authority for this appeal is
Utah Code Annotated§ 30-3-5(3).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Nature of Case

This appeal is from a final order of the Second Judicial
District Court, Honorable Jon M. Memmott

granting the

Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment on Respondent's Petition
To Modify Decree of Divorce.
2.

Course of Proceedings

The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered by
the Second District Court on November 30, 1992. On January 29,
1998 Respondent filed a petition to modify the award of
retirement benefits based upon Respondent's severe disability
sustained subsequent to entry of the Decree of Divorce.
Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule
56(c) of Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure.
3.

Disposition in the Lower Court

The court granted Petitioner's motion for summary judgment,
ruling that, as a matter of law, Respondent was not entitled to
modification of the Decree.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

~he

entered by the Second District Court or: U vember 30, 19>:::.
'-~~cree

of Div :::e was based upon a Stinu1ation and Propertv

Settlement Agreement signed by the
Fac~s

Statement of

of Respondent's

(Paragraph

Memorand~m

In

Opposi~io~

To

.·. 1mmary JudgJ

Mo

the Decree the Petitioner was avJarded a one-half

-~~

(1/2) interest

~~Respondent's

Memorandur:

the time o·

3.

"

J;;dgment) .

--·. :-ce, the Rec;;,::;r:dent was 42 years

ad worked as a licensed D1urnber.

Cl..

Fac~s

ts of Respo

Opposition To Net Jon For Summar

1

d~~l-~

retirement benefits accrued

h 2, Staterree

· · e marriage.

old

arties.

(Paragraoh

Statement of

j,

of Respondent's Memorandum :n Opposition T

Motion For

·mmary Judgn ·
4.

At

:.c

t~me

of the divorce, ·te Respondent did

contemplate drawing on l.
rec:.i.;::eci at

6~~

Respondent's

years of aqe.

:e~lrement

pension funa

un~ll

he

(i?araqraph 4, Statement of Facts of

emoranclu:r In Opposi t.::.on

~

~·

tion For Summary

.dgment)
5.

On --'--i :.., 1995, Respondent,

3

v:Ll.;.;:;

·,.,rorking,

fe~.:..

:_w::;,

stories onto cement and sustained a serious spinal cord injury.
Respondent does not have the use of his legs and is confined to a
wheel chair. The Respondent also has only limited use of his
arms. The Respondent is no longer capable of employment and is no
longer able to earn sufficient income to maintain his basic
living expenses.

(Paragraph 5, Statement of Facts of Respondent's

Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment)
6.

In February, 1996, as a result of his disability, the

Respondent qualified for early payments from his retirement and
pension funds. He has been receiving $578.00 per month from the
Utah Pipe Trades Pension Trust Fund and $610.00 per month from
the Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund. These payments
will be made to the Respondent for the rest of his life. The
Respondent also is receiving Social Security disability payments.
(Paragraph 6, Statements of Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In
Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment)
7.

Had it not been for Respondent's unfortunate injuries,

the Respondent would not have been eligible to receive retirement
benefits from his retirement pension funds until he reached 62
years of age. (Paragraph 7, Statement of Facts, Respondent's
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment)

4

8.

Prior to the accident, the Respondent was earning

$3,000.00 to $4,000.00 per month. (Paragraph 8, Statement of
Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For
Summary Judgment)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Summary Judgment should be granted only when the evidence,
considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The lower court granted Petitioner's motion for summary
judgment on the basis that, as a matter of law, it could not
modify the property award to exclude Respondent's disability
payments from distribution in the Decree of Divorce.

Hence,

Respondent never even got to the question of whether there had
been a change of circumstance since entry of the decree.

The

trial court simply ruled it did not have authority.
The applicable statute is clear that courts have continuing
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes in divorce decrees for
the distribution of property.

Moreover, the benefits that the

Respondent is currently receiving are disability benefits
and as such are not marital property subject to distribution in

5

the decree. It is submitted that the lower court erred in
granting Petitioner's motion for summary judgment and that as a
matter of law, the lower court has continuing jurisdiction to
modify the Decree of Divorce as requested by the Respondent. As
such the case should be remanded for a determination on the
threshold question as to whether there has been a substantial and
material change of circumstance.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BASIS FOR REVIEW

Summary Judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). In the
case at hand, the district court ruled that it did not, as a
matter of law, have the authority to modify the property division
in the decree, as requested by Respondent. The Respondent
contends the district court does have continuing
jurisdiction to modify property awards, to include the retirement
annuity.

6

POINT II
THE COURT HAS CONTINUTNG JURISDICTION TO MODIFY PROVISIONS IN A
DECREE OF DIVORCE REGARDING DIVSION OF PROPERTY

Case law, as well as state statute authorizes a court to
modify property distributions. Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(3) provides
as follows:
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the custody
of the children and their support, maintenance,
health and dental care and for distribution of
the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary. (emphasis added).
A trial court may modify the division of property in a
stipulated divorce decree under a showing of a substantial change
of circumstances since entry of the decree and not contemplated
in the decree itself Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct App
1990); Williams v. Sherwood, 688 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1984);

Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.d 181 (Utah 1981)

(reallocation of

property rights in installment payments of income from real
property) .
In McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979), the
Supreme Court stated the following
Under Utah law, a trial court granting a Decree of
Divorce is afforded considerable discretion in the area
of property distribution . . . the court has continuing
jurisdiction over the parties with regard to the

7

decree, enabling it to make subsequent modifications as
are equitable. The breadth of discretionary power given
the trial court in the initial determination of the
property division extends in equal measure to these
subsequent modifications.
In other cases the Utah Supreme Court has stated that, while
the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify property
settlements, such should be resorted to with "great reluctance
and for compelling reasons". Land v. Land 605 P.2d 1248, 1251
(Utah

1980); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse supra at 61.
In Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, the trial court modified the

distribution of equity in the marital home and timing of pay out
of a retirement program.
In the present case, at the time of entry of the decree, the
parties were contemplating that Petitioner would begin receiving
her share of Respondent's retirement benefits only when the
Respondent reached 62 years of age, the age when Respondent could
begin receiving retirement benefits under his retirement plan.
The parties did not contemplate any other circumstance wherein
Respondent would begin receiving benefits from his retirement
pension funds prior to Respondent reaching 62 years of age. The
decree is silent on this issue. The Respondent's injuries
subsequent to entry of the Decree were not contemplated by the
decree. The Respondent's severe and debilitating injuries
represent a substantial change in circumstances from the
circumstances that existed at the time the decree was entered. In

8

addition, Respondent's injuries represent a compelling reason for
the decree to be modified to provide for the circumstance that
the parties now find themselves in.
POINT III
THE BENEFITS THAT THE RESPONDENT IS CURRENTLY RECEIVING ARE
DISABILITY BENEFITS AND ARE NOT A MARTIAL ASSET SUBJECT TO
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE

The appellate courts in many states have held that
disability payments, intended to compensate the employee for lost
earning capacity, are not marital property subject to equitable
distribution between the parties in a divorce. Ciliberti v.

Ciliberti, 374 Pa.Super. 228, 542 A. 2d 580 (Pa.1988); Allard v.
Allard, 708 A. 2d 554 (Rhode Island 1998); In

ReMarriage of

Stenquist, 21 Cal.3d 779, 148 Cal. Rptr, 9, 582 P.2d 96 (Ca.
1978); In Re Haag, 122 Or. App 230, 857 P. 2d 208(0re. 1993);

Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 547, 521 A. 2d 370 (Md. 1987); Avallone
v. Avallone, 275 NJ Super.575, 646 A. 2d 112l(N.J.l994); Freeman
v. Freeman, 468 So.2d 326 (Fla.1985); Courts have been willing
to look behind the labels of "retirement benefits" and
"disability benefits" to determine the true nature of the
benefits that are received by the recipient of the benefits.

Ciliberti v. Ciliberti, supra, Allard v. Allard, supra; Avallone
v. Avallone, supra. Retirement benefits are generally considered
deferred compensation for past service, and are therefore
9

considered to be a marital asset subject to distribution upon
dissolution of the marriage. Knies v. Knies, 979 P. 2d 482
(Washington 1999). In contrast, disability benefits compensate
for lost earnings resulting from a diminished capacity to compete
in the employment market. Allard v. Allard, supra. "Disability
benefits may serve multiple purposes. They may compensate for the
loss of earnings resulting from compelled premature retirement
and from a diminished ability to compete in the employment
market. Disability benefits may also serve to compensate the
disabled person for personal suffering caused by the disability."

Ciliberti v. Ciliberti, supra, at 233, quoting In Re Marriage of
Stenquist supra, at 101.
As such, disability benefits are the injured party's sole
property and are not subject to distribution upon the dissolution
of the marriage.
Losses incurred after entry of final divorce, including
future loss of wages, future medical expenses and
future loss of earning capacity are the injured
spouse's separate property and not subject to equitable
distribution upon dissolution of the parties marriage.

Allard vs. Allard, supra.
In this matter, payments received by the Respondent are in
lieu of earnings that would have been paid to him if he had been
able to work.

Therefore, the payments received by the

Respondent are disability payments, and as such are the

10

Respondent's separate property and are not subject to
distribution to the Petitioner.
In Avallone, supra the husband had vested rights in a
retirement pension, but had not completed the necessary years of
service.

Therefore, his right to receive the retirement pension

had not matured.

The husband was eligible for retirement

benefits when he reached fifty five years of age, but was only
forty four years of age when he became disabled.

The court

ruled that payments to the husband were disability benefits, and
thus were not subject to division with the wife.
These facts are similar to the facts in this case.
Respondent would have been eligible to receive retirement
benefits twenty years after the disability occurred.

Therefore,

Respondent's rights to receive retirement benefits had not yet
matured when the disability occurred.

To allow the Petitioner

to share in the Respondent's disability benefits provides an
unexpected windfall for the Petitioner, and a financial hardship
for the Respondent.
Respondent is not seeking to divest the Petitioner of her
share in Respondent's actual retirement benefits.

Respondent

agrees that the Petitioner should share in the retirement
benefits as contemplated by the Decree, i.e., when the
Respondent reaches 62 years of age, and would be eligible for
retirement benefits according to the provisions of his
11

retirement plan.
CONCLUSION

The lower court erred in granting summary judgment to
Petitioner.

As a matter of law, Respondent's disability

benefits are not a marital asset subject to distribution with
Petitioner.

Th~refore

Respondent is entitled to modify the

Decree of Divorce to exclude Respondent's disability benefits
from distribution in the decree of divorce.
DATED this

2'1+~ day of June, 2000

Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that the BRIEF OF APPELLANT was sent via
First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ~9+?day of June,
2000 to the following counsel of record:

George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Appellee

12

Addendum #1

Copy of Summary Judgment Order

George K. Fadel i1027
Attorney for Plaintiff
170 weat 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone:

.. 1 ......

295-2421

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

CAROL LYNN ADAMSON,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENYING

Plaintiff,
vs.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MODIFY

)

DECREE OF DIVORCE

)

Civil No. 9247001125 DA

TED JAY ADAMSON I

Defendant.

Judge Jon M. Memmott

}

---------~~-~---------------~~~-------------·-~-~---------------

The hearing on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

denying defendant's petition for modification of decree of
divorce, came on before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, District
Judge, on Tuesday the 24th day of August, 1999.

Plaintiff

appeared in person and by counsel, George K. Fadel.
appeared in person and by counsel Alan R. Stewart.

Defendant
The Court

having read the memoranda filed by the parties and hearing the
arguments of counsel, and having heretofore made and entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and it appearing that

Summary Judgment should be entered pursuant to Rule 56, utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the pleadings, decree and other
information contained in the record show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, now therefor:
IT IS ORDBUD, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1

1.

The QUADRO as amended is res judicata as to the

entitlement of the parties to retirement benefits of the
defendant, and the Court is without jurisdiction to modify the
QUADRO as to the plaintiff's entitlement pursuant to the Decree
of Divorce entered in this cause.
2.

Summary Judgment is hereby entered denying the

defendant•s motion to modify the decree of divorce.
3•

No costs are

Dated

awarded either party.

this24~day of

September, 1999.
BY TBB COURT ~

-=r~ro.

ro ~

DISTRICT JUDGE

2

CERTIFICATE

OF MAILING

r certify that on the 26th day of Augustt 1999, I mailed
a copy of the Findings and Judgment relating ~o the petition for
modification of .the 'decree ·of divorce. to Mr. Alan R. Stewart,

attorney for the defendant-respondent,l366 East Murray-Holladay
Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117.
/

